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THOMAS D. RUSSELL* 
  ABSTRACT 
This Article is about civil procedure, torts, insurance, litigation, and professional 
ethics. The Article is the opening article in a conversation with Stanford Law Professor 
Nora Freeman Engstrom, who has written about the plaintiffs’ bar and settlement mill 
attorneys.  
The empirical center of this piece examines 356 answers to 298 car crash personal 
injury cases in Colorado’s district courts. The Article situates these cases within 
dispute pyramid elements including the total number of miles-traveled within 
Colorado and the volume of civil litigation.  
The Article then analyzes the defense attorneys’ departures from the Colorado 
Rules of Civil Procedure, especially Rule 8. In particular, I count and analyze lawyers’ 
claims that they need not answer because an allegation calls for a legal conclusion; is 
directed at a co-defendant; or that a statute or document "speaks for itself." 
The Article also generally discusses the failure to investigate claims before 
answering, which, in my opinion, violates Rule 11 and the Code of Professional 
Conduct. 
Last, the title derives from the final empirical section, which examines the pleading 
of laundry lists of so-called “affirmative defenses.” The Article shows that on average, 
each defense attorney includes nine items within a list of defenses. Few are true 
affirmative defenses. For 90 percent of the lists of defenses, there is no factual support 
whatsoever. On average, insurance defense attorneys plead 0.14 facts in support of 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Sometime after the first-year civil procedure course, insurance defense lawyers 
learn to ignore the rules of civil procedure when filing answers to lawsuits. First-year 
law students in the United States study the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 Their 
professors teach that for each allegation in plaintiffs’ complaints, the Rules require 
defendants to answer by admitting, denying, or stating that they do not have sufficient 
information to form a belief about the allegation, which Rule 8 then deems denied.2 
Most states have patterned their rules of civil procedure after the Federal Rules—
including Colorado, which is the subject of this study.3 In most state courts, then, 
 
1 FED. R. CIV. P.  
2 JOSEPH W. GLANNON ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A COURSEBOOK 23 (3d ed. 2017); GEOFFREY 
C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 590–91 (11th ed. 
2015); BROOKE D. COLEMAN ET AL., LEARNING CIVIL PROCEDURE 310–14 (3d ed. 2018); 
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL & JOANNA C. SCHWARTZ, CIVIL PROCEDURE 427 (10th ed. 2018); GENE R. 
SHREVE ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.08 (6th ed. 2019); RICHARD D. FREER, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.3.4 (4th ed. 2017); HOWARD M. ERICHSON, INSIDE CIVIL PROCEDURE 118–
19 (3d ed. 2018); THOMAS A. MAUET & DAVID MARCUS, PRETRIAL § 5.5, at 160 (9th ed. 2015).  
3 For a survey of each jurisdiction accompanying Colorado in the extent to which they reflect a 
similarity to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The 
Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. 
L. REV. 1367, 1370 & n.21 (1986), which found that twenty-two states (along with the District 
of Columbia) replicate the Federal Rules and that ten others are similar but lack at least one of 
the strict requirements necessary to be considered a replica. However, the most recent trend is 
away from conformity with the federal rules. See John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss4/6
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defense lawyers are to admit, deny, or say that they have insufficient information or 
knowledge to form a belief.4 Defense lawyers can also admit part of an allegation 
while denying the remainder.5 After answering plaintiffs’ allegations, lawyers for 
defendants may append affirmative defenses that purport to defeat the plaintiffs’ entire 
claims.6  
This Article presents original empirical data concerning the legal system in action. 
I first describe the broader context of automobile travel, crashes, and litigation that 
sociolegal scholars refer to as the “dispute pyramid,” although I suggest that a salmon 
run might be a more apt metaphor for the difficulty navigating from car crash through 
claims and litigation toward compensation.7 I examine the total number of miles 
traveled, the number of crashes, and the number of crashes causing injuries.8 People 
generally think there is too much litigation, a claim that means nothing without actual 
data as to how many suits could exist relative to how many actually do exist.9 These 
data about injury and litigation rates are not central to my argument, but given the 
paucity of data concerning the actual operation of the legal system, I felt some 
obligation to collect and present these data. 
Next, I establish the proportion of all personal injury litigation that is car crash 
lawsuits.10 The single-event tort world—as opposed to mass torts or class actions—is 
really about car crashes and not about slip-and-falls, dog bites, train injuries, and, 
especially, not about medical malpractice. 
After situating automobile travel, crashes, injuries, and litigation within broader 
empirical contexts, I get down to the business of analyzing the answers themselves.11 
This study examines answers that insurance defense lawyers filed in automobile car 
 
Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 383 (2003) (“Even among states that fifteen years ago 
could be counted as substantially conforming to the federal model of procedure, recent 
significant amendments have been more frequently rejected or ignored than adopted.”).  
4 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b) (“A party shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim 
asserted and shall admit or deny the averments of the adverse party. If he is without knowledge 
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and this 
has the effect of a denial.” (emphasis added)). 
5 Id. (“When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, 
he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder.”). 
6 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(c).  
7 See infra Part II.  
8 See infra Part II. 
9 See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1095 
(1996) (explaining the commonly held view about tort claims that “Americans sue too readily, 
‘at the drop of a hat;’ egged on by avaricious lawyers, they overwhelm our congested courts 
with mounting numbers of suits, including many frivolous claims”); Thomas D. Russell, Blood 
on the Tracks: Turn-of-the-Century Streetcar Injuries, Claims, and Litigation in Alameda 
County, California (Oct. 23, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). 
10 See infra Part II. 
11 See infra Part III.  
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crash cases in Colorado. I analyze 356 answers. The first part of an answer consists of 
the defense attorney’s responses to the plaintiff’s allegations. The first part of my 
analysis catalogs defense departures from the Rules when responding to the 
allegations of complaints.12 This part of the analysis is empirical but only lightly 
quantitative.  
After admitting or denying allegations, lawyers for defendants have an opportunity 
to include affirmative defenses in sections of answers usually titled “Affirmative 
Defenses” or simply “Defenses.” My method is very simple and easily reproduced: I 
count the total number of defenses and then I count the defenses that the insurance 
defense lawyers have supported with at least one fact.13 
This Article shows that the insurance defense attorneys generally engage in 
routinized practices; conduct little to no pre-answer factual investigation themselves 
and ignore any factual investigation that claims agents have already conducted; ignore 
the rules of civil procedure; take purposive, obstructive actions that defeat the fact-
finding goals of pleading; likely delegate legal work to paralegals; and, in my opinion, 
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.14 
Criticizing lawyers, judges, and the legal system is a responsibility of law 
professors.15 For law professors, law reviews are like letters to the editor except longer 
and with lots of footnotes.16 In this Article, I communicate my professional opinions17 
on matters of public interest and general concern18 including the behavior of some 
 
12 See infra Part III.  
13 See infra Part IV.  
14 See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1538–
39 (2009) [hereinafter Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice] (describing anecdotal evidence that 
settlement mills sacrifice client recoveries for speed and efficiency); see also Nora Freeman 
Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 841 (2011) [hereinafter 
Engstrom, Sunlight] (“[S]ome settlement mills . . . have non-attorneys negotiate settlements of 
third-party personal injury claims in apparent violation of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 
5.5.”). 
15 Deborah L. Rhode, The Professional Responsibilities of Professors, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 158, 
166 (2001) (“Law professors have unique opportunities and corresponding obligations. Time 
and tenure give us the luxury of directing our attention to matters that matter to us. But with that 
privilege comes a responsibility to focus at least some of our efforts on what also matters to the 
public—on how well law and lawyers are serving its interests.”). 
16 Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broad. Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1360 (Colo. 1983) (“Allegedly 
defamatory language must be examined in the context in which it is uttered.”). 
17 Because the opinions in this Article are mine as a law professor, they are not the opinions of 
any other person or entity including the student editors of this journal; the Cleveland State Law 
Review; Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; Cleveland State University; nor, least of all, the 
University of Denver. 
18 Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1986) (requiring plaintiffs in 
defamation actions to prove falsity and fault in matters of public interest and general concern); 
Diversified Mgmt., Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103, 1110 (Colo. 1982) (“We now 
believe that the robust debate on public issues that we were seeking to protect in Walker is better 
protected by using the St. Amant definition of ‘reckless disregard’ in cases involving matters of 
public or general concern, as well as in cases involving public officials and public figures.”); 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss4/6
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insurance defense attorneys in car-crash litigation, deviations from the rules of civil 
procedure by some defense attorneys, departures by some insurance defense lawyers 
from the legal profession’s ethical rules, and the complicity of some members of the 
plaintiffs’ bar and bench in allowing these declines of legal professionalism. These 
matters are of general concern because how our courts adjudicate civil actions 
involving car crashes, insurance, tort law, and other litigation are important to the 
public interest. Systematic, rigorous investigation of publicly filed answers and 
complaints supports my factual analysis and opinions, as do academic freedom, 
tenure, and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.19 I welcome 
competing argument.20 Within the Article, the fair report or fair presentation privilege 
protects my recounting of the claims plaintiffs make in their public complaints and of 
the defenses that defendants offer in return, even though the lawsuits are, at that point, 
unresolved.21 As for the lawyers, my expert legal opinion as an academic who 
practices law is that lawyers who present arguments in publicly filed pleadings, 
motions, and other documents consent to their use by scholars in precisely the same 
 
id. at 1106 (“[F]irst amendment values would be better honored by adopting the same definition 
of ‘reckless disregard’ in cases involving public officials, public figures, and matters of public 
or general concern.”); COLO. COMM. ON PATTERN CIV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL JURY 
INSTRUCTION 22:3 (Reckless Disregard Defined—Where the Plaintiff Is a Public Official or 
Public Person or, If a Private Person, the Statement Pertained to a Matter of Public Interest or 
General Concern) (“A statement is published with reckless disregard when, at the time of 
publication, the person publishing it believes that the statement is probably false or has serious 
doubts as to its truth.”). 
19 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press . . . .”); see also COLO. CONST. art. II, § 10 (“[E]very person shall be free to speak, 
write or publish whatever he will on any subject, being responsible for all abuse of that liberty; 
and in all suits and prosecutions for libel the truth thereof may be given in evidence, and the 
jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the fact.”); OHIO CONST. art. 
I, § 11 (“Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being 
responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty 
of speech, or of the press.”). 
20 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974) (“Under the First Amendment 
there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for 
its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”). 
21 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.05 (West 2020); Tonnessen v. Denver Pub. Co., 5 P.3d 959, 
964 (Colo. App. 2000) (“[U]nder the common law doctrine of fair report, reports of in-court 
proceedings containing defamatory material are privileged if they are fair and substantially 
correct, or are substantially accurate accounts of what took place.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 611 (AM. L. INST. 1977) (“The publication of defamatory matter concerning another 
in a report of an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public that deals with 
a matter of public concern is privileged if the report is accurate and complete or a fair 
abridgement of the occurrence reported.”); see also Catalanello v. Kramer, 18 F. Supp. 3d 504, 
509 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (granting a law professor’s motion to dismiss a defamation complaint after 
the professor “accepted an offer from the Washington University Law Review to publish the 
article and, during that same month, posted the article to the Social Science Research Network 
(SSRN), an online repository of academic research”); Zachary A. Kramer, Of Meat and 
Manhood, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 287 (2011). 
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way that advocates who argue before the United States Supreme Court agree to engage 
not just the Justices but the entire world—including law professors—in argument.22  
Another aim of this study is to begin to engage the work of Stanford Law School’s 
Professor Nora Freeman Engstrom.23 Professor Engstrom has written a series of 
fascinating articles about what she and others call “settlement mills.”24 Settlement 
mills are law firms that represent personal injury claimants.25 The lawyers in Professor 
Engstrom’s settlement mills never, or at most rarely, file lawsuits.26 Instead, they 
churn their clients’ smallish claims and achieve even smaller settlements with 
insurance companies.27 Professor Engstrom interviewed many settlement-mill lawyers 
and combined her qualitative research with other scholars’ quantitative research.28 The 
settlement-mill lawyers’ efforts fascinate Professor Engstrom even as their means of 
achieving settlement at times appears to horrify the Stanford professor.29 I read part of 
 
22 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) (“In preserving that form of government 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments command nothing less than that the States may not 
impose sanctions on the publication of truthful information contained in official court 
records open to public inspection.”); see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 (“An individual who 
decides to seek governmental office must accept certain necessary consequences of that 
involvement in public affairs.”). 
23 Nora Freeman Engstrom, STAN. L. SCH., https://law.stanford.edu/directory/nora-freeman-
engstrom/ [https://perma.cc/NQR6-XQZT] (describing Professor Engstrom’s work as a 
nationally recognized expert in both tort law and legal ethics, her written work on various 
subjects including settlement mills, and her memberships in the American Law Institute and 
World Tort Law Society). 
24 Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14; Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 14; Nora 
Freeman Engstrom, Legal Access and Attorney Advertising, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& LAW 1083 (2011) [hereinafter Engstrom, Legal Access]; Nora Freeman Engstrom, Shining a 
Light on Shady Personal Injury Claims, 2 J. INS. FRAUD AM. 13 (2011). 
25 Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1486 (“[H]igh-volume personal injury 
law practices that aggressively advertise and mass produce the resolution of claims . . . .”); 
Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 14, at 807 (defining settlement mills as personal injury firms 
that advertise aggressively, settle a high volume of low-stakes claims, engage in little attorney-
client interaction, and rarely take claims to trial). 
26 Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1487–88 (describing “conventional” 
personal injury lawyers as those who litigate cases and appear in court and settlement-mill 
attorneys as those who have a larger client base, aggressively advertise, contract a higher 
percentage of those who call as potential clients, delegate more tasks to non-attorneys, file fewer 
lawsuits, and take even fewer or no cases to trial). 
27 Id. at 1535–42. 
28 See, e.g., id. at 1527–28 (providing a quote from a Garnett & Associates attorney saying that 
“the smaller cases are better off settled” to show that the average amount paid by a tort defendant 
compared to settlement mills’ average gross recovery (adjusted for inflation) incentivizes a 
preference among both plaintiffs and defendants to settle). 
29 See, e.g., id. at 1505 (explaining how Sledge, a.k.a. “the hammer,” would use his office 
manager to negotiate and settle with insurance adjusters, and then evaluate her performance 
based on the number of files settled and amount of money collected). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss4/6
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her message as being “Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Settlement-Mill 
Personal Injury Lawyers.”30 
My remix: “Don’t Let Your Law Students Grow Up to Be Insurance Defense Mill 
Lawyers.” In her research, Professor Engstrom conducted confidential telephone 
interviews with personal injury lawyers who had worked in settlement mills.31 In 
contrast, this Article looks at the filed, public work of lawyers who defend personal 
injury lawsuits on behalf of insurance companies.32 Adapting Professor Engstrom’s 
nomenclature, I refer to these lawyers—working on the other side of the industry from 
the lawyers whom Professor Engstrom interviewed and studied—as insurance defense 
mill lawyers.33 My conclusions parallel those of Professor Engstrom. 
Insurance defense mill lawyers do not work directly opposite Professor 
Engstrom’s settlement-mill lawyers. Rather, they work on the opposite side of the 
versus in the lawsuit’s caption—the insurance and defense side. However, the defense 
lawyers are one step further along in the litigation process than their plaintiff-side 
counterparts. Insurance defense mill lawyers answer complaints, which by Professor 
Engstrom’s definition, the settlement-mill lawyers almost never file.34 The lawyers 
who actually file complaints—as opposed to settle cases without filing—Professor 
Engstrom calls “conventional” lawyers.35 Insurance defense mill lawyers answer the 
complaints of these conventional lawyers. 
A generation ago, Kent Syverud, then a Michigan and Vanderbilt law professor 
and now chancellor of Syracuse University, made the point that personal injury 
lawyers and liability insurers live symbiotically. “The insurance industry and the trial 
lawyers may take potshots at each other in attempts to reform aspects of the 
 
30 See ED BRUCE, Mammas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow up to Be Cowboys, on ED BRUCE 
(United Artists Records 1975); see also WAYLON JENNINGS & WILLIE NELSON, Mammas Don’t 
Let Your Babies Grow up to Be Cowboys, on WAYLON AND WILLIE (RCA Records 1978). 
31 See, e.g., Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 14, at 819 & nn.51–57 (maintaining the anonymity 
of settlement-mill attorneys who prioritized speed and settlements and referred cases to other 
firms when a suit proceeded to litigation). Professor Engstrom’s prodigious research also 
included the review of thousands—maybe tens of thousands—of pages of documentary 
evidence including records of disciplinary proceedings and attorney malpractice 
actions. Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1488 n.13. 
32 The data are from lawsuits filed during the first six months of 2015. The complaints, answers, 
and most of the filings in each case are open, public records. They are available for a fee through 
Colorado Courts E-Filing, the entity that handles electronic filing in Colorado, or they are 
available for free (though only as printed documents) through the Colorado Supreme Court, 
which is where my research assistant and I collected them. See infra Part III. 
33 Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 14, at 855 (describing how settlement-mill lawyers rarely 
file lawsuits and, as a result, rarely interact with insurance defense attorneys or judges).  
34 Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1502–03 (describing the difference 
between the settlement mills she researched that file suit at rates between 5% and 15% and their 
conventional counterparts, which file suit approximately 50% of the time). 
35 See Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1487–88. 
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relationship,” Syverud explained, “but they cannot afford to shoot to kill.”36 Syverud 
understands that, like the relationships between clownfish and sea anemones and 
between African oxpeckers and giraffes, plaintiffs’ lawyers and the insurance industry 
rely upon each other.37 Perhaps symbiosis is not a sufficient description, as plaintiffs’ 
lawyers do not merely sustain liability insurers as if chasing away butterfly fish and 
flies: plaintiffs’ lawyers expand the demand for liability insurance.38 The reverse is 
also true. Liability insurers supply plaintiffs and their lawyers with the money that 
keeps the plaintiffs’ bar in business.39 
Although the insight about symbiosis is not fresh, empirical scholars, including 
Professor Engstrom, have focused their gaze mostly on the plaintiff side of the 
relationship. Few empirical scholars have looked into the defense side of the 
mutualistic relationship.40 When referring to the work of the claims agents—the 
insurance industry employees who work opposite the settlement mills—scholars tend 
to rely on the excellent though somewhat stale insights that H. Laurence Ross first 
articulated in his 1970 book Settled Out of Court: The Social Process of Insurance 
Claims Adjustment.41 Professor Ross, of what was then SUNY Buffalo but is now the 
 
36 Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1990). 
37 See Daphne Gail Fautin, The Anemonefish Symbiosis: What Is Known and What Is Not, 10 
SYMBIOSIS 23, 38–40 (1991) (explaining how anemonefishes, commonly known as clownfish, 
rely on anemones, inter alia, for protection, habitat stability for laying eggs, and the benefit of 
eating anemone waste and tentacles); sea also FINDING NEMO (Walt Disney Pictures, Pixar 
Animation Studios 2003); TANYA ANDERSON, GIRAFFE EXTINCTION: USING SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY TO SAVE THE GENTLE GIANTS 55 (2020) (describing the reliance phenomenon by 
discussing how “[t]icks burrow into a giraffe’s skin and . . . . Oxpeckers walk all over a giraffe’s 
body inspecting for ticks to grab with their yellow bills,” and then some oxpeckers spend the 
night “hanging out (literally) in [the] giraffe’s armpit”).  
38 Syverud, supra note 36, at 1114 (“[W]e tend to place insurance in the reactive role: tort 
litigation expands, liability insurance adjusts; courts create a new type of tort, insurance 
companies respond with a new type of policy; juries award larger verdicts, insurance companies 
raise their premiums. We look to changes in tort law and civil procedure for the causes of 
changes in liability insurance. Tort litigation, not liability insurance, dominates the 
relationship.”). 
39 Id. (“Without liability insurance, most tort suits would be significantly less attractive to 
plaintiffs and their attorneys, and a large fraction of the lawsuits and the tort law bar would fade 
away.”). 
40 Herbert M. Kritzer, The Commodification of Insurance Defense Practice, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
2053, 2054 (“[T]here is relatively little research, either empirical or theoretical, focused 
specifically on the lawyers who routinely stand opposite the plaintiffs’ bar: the insurance 
defense bar.”). When Professor Engstrom started her research, there had been little systematic 
study of the plaintiffs’ bar, either. Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1487 
n.7. 
41 H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS 
ADJUSTMENT (2d ed. Routledge 1980) (1970); see Christopher J. Robinette, Two Roads Diverge 
for Civil Recourse Theory, 88 IND. L.J. 543, 555 (2013) (noting that H. Laurence Ross provided 
“considerable empirical data about how claims adjusters actually work.”); see also Syverud, 
supra note 36, at 1138 (referring to H. Laurence Ross’s finding that in settlement negotiations 
with attorneys, claims adjusters use the bargaining tactic of asking a supervisor to allow a high 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss4/6
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University at Buffalo, studied insurance claims adjusters and their supervisors.42 “The 
adjuster,” Ross explained, “is, then, the key man in the handling of most automobile 
injury claims.”43 Even Ross’s gender-specific language—empirically accurate at the 
time—dates his work. Today, a majority of insurance claims agents are women.44 
This Article crosses from the plaintiffs’ side to look at the work of insurance 
defense lawyers. When not extrapolating from Ross’s old conclusions about “claims 
men,” Professor Engstrom and others mostly leave to their readers’ imaginations the 
inner workings of insurance claims handling and insurance defense.45 Professor 
Engstrom shows how plaintiffs’ lawyers in settlement mills engage in routinized 
practices, conduct very little factual investigation, and take shortcuts to achieve the 
quick settlement of small cases.46  
Which side’s questionable practices came first is an anemone-and-clownfish type 
of question that this Article does not seek to answer. The simple insight is that, 
titillating as studies of plaintiffs’ lawyers may be, additional study of the plaintiffs’ 
side without a correlative look into defense work perpetuates a distorted view of tort 
litigation. Personal injury claims and litigation are, obviously, dualistic with the 
opposing sides forming dialectically. My hunch is that the imbalance of research—the 
sustained focus on the plaintiffs’ bar rather than a multi perspectival approach—
reflects a Mugwumpish worldview of elite law professors who want to distance 
themselves—and their students—from the business practices and zealous 







settlement amount only to be denied and forced to return to the attorney claiming that a lower 
agreement must be reached). 
42 ROSS, supra note 41. 
43 ROSS, supra note 41, at 25.  
44 Women account for 82% of “[i]nsurance claims and policy clerks” and about 60% of the 
insurance industry’s total workforce. Facts + Statistics: Careers and Employment, INS. INFO. 
INST., https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-careers-and-employment 
[https://perma.cc/3H99-5WJ2]. 
45 Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1508 (describing negotiations between 
non-lawyer employees at settlement-mill firms and insurance claims adjusters that were fairly 
brief and rarely included the discussion of any legal issues such as comparative negligence). 
46 Id. at 1494 (“[E]ven the initial client interview was mechanized: clients were shown a video 
of their attorney explaining the case settlement process, rather than having a real-live attorney 
provide that information.”); see also id. at 1494–95 (“[G]roup settlement meetings with claims 
adjusters were conducted, and numerous clients’ claims were resolved at one sitting.”); 
Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 14, at 850 (“Settlement mills do not typically engage in a fine-
grained assessment of fault; they invest little in each case’s factual and legal development; and 
they sometimes delegate ‘legal work’ to non-lawyer personnel.”).  
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II. CAR CRASHES AND PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION IN COLORADO 
Torts is about car crashes.47 When I tell people outside of law schools that I teach 
torts, I say the subject is car crashes. There are all sorts of other types of cases included 
in torts textbooks.48 In this way, the torts course misrepresents the actual work of 
personal injury claiming and litigation. Car crashes are not sexy.  
Car crashes are the paradigm single-event torts.49 Single-event means an individual 
incident that leads to an injury of, typically, one or a few people.50 A car speeds, runs 
a stop sign, fails to signal while changing lanes, or does not stop in time and—
boom!—crashes into another. Maybe the drivers share some comparative fault. Their 
combined crash is a single-event tort. Likewise, when the Amazon delivery person 
slips and falls on icy front steps; the dog bites the neighbor kid; a doctor misdiagnoses 
a patient; or a lawyer misses the statute of limitations for a client, we refer to these 
incidents as single-event torts. One person is injured, maybe several. The injury arises 
from a single event—one crash, one fall, one bite, or one professional error. Plane 
crashes are single-event torts with more injuries.51 
Single-event tort litigation differs from other realms. Mass torts, for example, deal 
with many different injuries to masses of people by similar but maybe not identical 
mechanisms.52 With mass torts, there are multiple parties and lawsuits in multiple 
 
47 See Nora Freeman Engstrom, When Cars Crash: The Automobile’s Tort Law Legacy, 22 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 293, 295 (2009) [hereinafter Engstrom, When Cars Crash] (“Of those 
hurt in auto accidents, roughly half seek third-party compensation. These compensation 
attempts are the 800-pound gorilla of the tort liability system, accounting for more than half of 
all trials, nearly two-thirds of all injury claims, and three-quarters of all damage payouts.”). 
48 RICHARD EPSTEIN & CATHERINE SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (12th ed. 2020); 
MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS (10th ed. 
2016); DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (5th ed. 2017); VICTOR 
E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS CASES AND MATERIALS (14th 
ed. 2020). 
49 Engstrom, When Cars Crash, supra note 47, at 299 (quoting scholars who have observed 
that automobile claims are the paradigm for individualized dispute resolution in the tort system). 
50 Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and 
Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 854 (1990) (referring to “single-event incidents of 
negligence (such as car accidents)”).  
51 Mass tort scholars also use the term “single-event” to refer to mass accidents. Linda S. 
Mullenix & Kristen B. Stewart, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: Fund 
Approaches to Resolving Mass Tort Litigation, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 121, 125 (2002) (“The events 
that occurred on September 11, 2001 encompass certain characteristics typical of mass accident 
cases, such as a single site, single event disaster; a large number of claimants; little geographical 
dispersion of claimants; and combined claims for personal injury, wrongful death, and property 
damage.”); see also § 1783 Class Actions in Which Common Questions Predominate Over 
Individual Questions—Mass-Accident Cases, 7AA Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 1783 (3d ed. 2005) (referring to “mass-accident or single-event cases” of mass 
torts).  
52 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 22.2 (4th ed. 2004); see NOLO’S PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW 
DICTIONARY, https://www.nolo.com/dictionary/mass-tort-term.html [https://perma.cc/NY2J-
A3PX]; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1407; Linda S. Mullenix, Practical Wisdom and Third-Generation 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss4/6
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jurisdictions.53 Litigation against Monsanto or Bayer over the weed-killer Roundup 
causing non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma is a good example of a mass tort.54 When a TV 
commercial asks, “Injured by [insert drug name here]?” mass tort lawyers are 
advertising for clients.55 “Injured in a car crash?” A single-event tort lawyer wants 
your business.56  
Class actions, when torts at all, are also not usually single-event torts.57 Class 
actions are about multiple parties injured in pretty much the same way by pretty much 
 
Mass Tort Litigation, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 551, 553 (1998). See generally LINDA S. MULLENIX, 
MASS TORT LITIGATION, CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2017). 
53 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 22.3 (4th ed. 2004). 
54 See Agricultural Management, 2018 A.B.A. SEC. ENV’T ENERGY & RES. COMM. REP. 1, 1–2 
(reporting on the first cancer patient, Dewayne Johnson, to take Monsanto to court because of 
California’s trial accessibility for dying plaintiffs, which lead the way for what was over 10,000 
pending cases against Bayer at the time); Kate Halloran, A Holistic Approach to Pesticide 
Litigation, TRIAL, May 2020, at 28, 29–34 (interviewing Jennifer A. Moore and Aimee Wagstaff 
who led the plaintiff‘s team that tried the initial bellwether case for federal multidistrict 
litigation involving Monsanto's Roundup and allegations that it causes non-Hodgkin’s 
lymphoma); see also Ruth Bender et al., Bayer to Pay up to $10.9 Billion to Settle Lawsuits 
over Roundup Weedkiller, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2020, 6:39 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bayer-reaches-10-5-billion-settlement-over-weedkiller-roundup-
11593017309 [https://perma.cc/3H99-5WJ2]; see also Laura Kusisto et al., Bayer Strives to End 
Lawsuits Over Roundup—While Still Selling It, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 12, 2020, 6:57 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bayer-strives-to-end-lawsuits-over-roundupwhile-still-selling-it-
11581535816 [https://perma.cc/BGG6-UPFY]; Sara Randazzo & Jacob Bunge, Inside the 
Mass-Tort Machine That Powers Thousands of Roundup Lawsuits, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 25, 2019, 
11:48 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-the-mass-tort-machine-that-powers-
thousands-of-roundup-lawsuits-11574700480 [https://perma.cc/2TAY-4AWA]. 
55 Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 251 (2016); 
Symposium, The Changing Landscape of the Practice, Financing and Ethics of Civil Litigation 
in the Wake of the Tobacco Wars, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183 (2001); Symposium, Judges as Tort 
Lawmakers, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 275 (1999); MASS TORTS MADE PERFECT, https://mtmp.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/5F77-MRXM].  
56 Engstrom, Legal Access, supra note 24, at 1089–90 (describing how, in the years after the 
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona decision, advertisements for legal services, and specifically 
personal injury legal services have increased significantly); Rebecca L. Sandefur, Bridging the 
Gap: Rethinking Outreach for Greater Access to Justice, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 721, 
734 (2015) (“Readers who watch contemporary commercial television will be familiar with 
advertisements for personal-injury attorneys. These ads often focus on a specific problem—a 
disease, an injury due to an accident, an injury caused by a medical device—and they explain 
to the viewer that compensation may be available for them if they have that problem, and that 
the advertiser may be able to provide help in getting that compensation.”). 
57 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 22.2 (4th ed. 2004); Linda S. Mullenix, Practical 
Wisdom and Third-Generation Mass Tort Litigation, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 551, 553 (1998); see 
also Samuel Issacharoff, Class Actions and State Authority, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 371 
(2012); Charles Silver, Comparing Class Actions and Consolidations, 10 REV. LITIG. 495, 501 
(1991); Charles E. Reuther, Class Actions and the Quest for A Fair Resolution in Mass Tort 
Litigation, N.J. LAW. MAG., Aug. 2011, at 33. 
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the same mechanism but often at different times.58 A single plaintiff or small group of 
plaintiffs represents the entire class of injured parties in one big lawsuit.59 The best 
version of class actions brings about social justice on a large scale.60 Too commonly 
in the past, the attorneys took huge fees and injured consumers got a coupon of some 
sort.61 Federal legislation, the Class Action Fairness Act, addressed the coupon issue.62  
Workers’ compensation cases fall outside the single-event tort system too.63 An 
employee may suffer a discrete injury in a single event, but for about the last century, 
 
58 The federal rules require that “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or 
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(a). The Colorado rules replicate the federal rules. COLO. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“(1) The 
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law 
or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical 
of the claims or defenses of the class.”); see also Oakley & Coon, supra note 3 (discussing state 
replication of federal rules); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.22 (4th ed. 2004). 
59 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); COLO. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
60 Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the American Class 
Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 402 (2014) (“During th[e] so-called golden age of class litigation 
[in the late 1960s and early 1970s], public interest lawyers used the class action mechanism to 
integrate school systems, deinstitutionalize mental health facilities, reform conditions of 
confinement for inmates in prison systems, challenge discriminatory housing and public 
accommodation laws, and address various types of employment discrimination.”). For Professor 
Mullenix’s examples of social justice victories through class actions, see id. at 402 n.7 (first 
citing Soc’y for the Good Will to Retarded Child., Inc. v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300, 1302–03 
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (ordering corrective measures to residents at a state institution for 
constitutional violations, beginning an eleven-year litigation saga culminating in a settlement), 
vacated, 737 F.2d 1239, 1242 (2d Cir. 1984); then citing Manicone v. Cleary, No. 74 C 575, 
slip op. (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 1975) (allowing prisoners to access telephones, subject to certain 
limitations); then citing United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687, 689 (E.D.N.Y.) (requiring 
the government to provide kosher food to an Orthodox Jewish prisoner), modified sub nom. 
Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 493 (2d Cir. 1975); then citing Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 383 
F. Supp. 699, 706–07 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (ordering integration of a Coney Island middle school 
as the proper relief for racial segregation), aff’d, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975); and then citing 
Wilson v. Beame, 380 F. Supp. 1232, 1244, 1248–52, (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (granting preliminary 
injunction allowing Muslim pretrial detainees to participate in religious services)). 
61 Robert B. Gerard & Scott A. Johnson, The Role of the Objector in Class Action Settlements—
A Case Study of the General Motors Truck “Side Saddle” Fuel Tank Litigation, 31 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 409, 411 (1998) (discussing General Motors settling a class action by providing each 
member of the class with a $1,000 coupon for a future General Motors vehicle purchase while 
paying the plaintiffs’ attorneys $9.5 million in fees).  
62 28 U.S.C. § 1712; Sarah S. Vance, A Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 
TUL. L. REV. 1617, 1632–33 (2006). 
63 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 352–55 (2002).  
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an administrative law system has handled these claims separately from the tort 
system.64 
A. The Dispute Pyramid or Salmon Run 
To understand whether there are many or few personal injury lawsuits requires 
empirical knowledge concerning how many people are injured.65 Sociolegal scholars 
refer to the “dispute pyramid” when situating the number of lawsuits or trials within a 
broader context.66 The dispute pyramid tries to settle the litigation process within the 
context of injuries, claims, visits to lawyers, and demands.67 An important effect of 
the dispute pyramid analysis is to show that a small proportion of injuries leads to 
lawsuits.68 Some people never even know they are injured; most know of the injury 
but lump it—that is, they blame no one and make no claim; some people do blame 
someone else or complain; as the number dwindles, some file grievances of some sort; 
a hardy few see lawyers; and lawyers, who have businesses to run, select only some 
of those cases for the filing of litigation.69 
Elsewhere, I have argued that the architectural or geometric metaphor of a pyramid 
misleadingly suggests smooth decline from one level to another.70 A better metaphor 
would be a salmon run in which thousands of eggs yield very, very few fish that return 
upstream to spawn because during their life cycles they encounter all sorts of lethal, 
natural, and human-made obstacles with, sometimes, the final obstacle being an 
upstream leap out of the water right into the mouth of a big ol’ bear.71 As the 
 
64 Id.; G. EDWARD WHITE, AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 104–05 
(2013).  
65 See Galanter, supra note 9, at 1099 (describing the “Dispute Pyramid” as the standard way 
scholars visualize tort litigation and noting that the layer formed by injuries is below the level 
of claims). 
66 Id. (“In order to understand the system of tort litigation, it is useful to visualize it, in the 
standard way that legal studies scholars do, as a ‘pyramid’ made up of successive layers.”); see 
William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, 
Blaming, and Claiming . . ., 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 632 (laying out a framework for the emergence 
and transformation of disputes including before a dispute has reached the legal system). 
67 Galanter, supra note 9, at 1099; Felstiner et al. supra note 66. 
68 Russell, supra note 9. 
69 Galanter, supra note 9, at 1099–1102; Felstiner et al. supra note 66, at 636.  
70 Russell, supra note 9. 
71 MARK KURLANSKY, SALMON: A FISH, THE EARTH, AND THE HISTORY OF A COMMON FATE, 51, 
63 (2020) (illustrating bears in the process of catching salmon); id. at 61 (describing salmon’s 
urge to return to the river and reproduce even though in the end it will be the death for most of 
the salmon); id. at 70 (discussing that half of the salmon’s fertilized eggs will die or be eaten 
and roughly eight percent will survive the journey back and reach the ocean).  
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demotivational poster of despair.com notes: “The journey of a thousand miles 
sometimes ends very, very badly.”72 
B. The Denominator Problem 
Empirical researchers ought to collect and not just imagine data for what Professor 
Marc Galanter, of the University of Wisconsin, called the “bottom layer.”73 Empirical 
scholars should make an effort when presenting the dispute pyramid or salmon run to 
start at least one level before injuries.74 Researchers should describe the underlying 
activity in empirical terms to provide context for the number of injuries.75 The raw 
number of people injured at McDonald’s will doubtless sound very high, but in the 
context of billions and billions served, the number injured may be less startling. I call 
this the denominator problem.  
To say there are a lot of lawsuits can only make sense if one knows the 
denominator. Consider medical malpractice.76 Lawsuits concerning the negligent 
errors of doctors require a denominator, which could be the number of patients, the 
number of radiological studies read, or perhaps the total number of patient-related 
decisions. As I show below, there are very few medical malpractice lawsuits in 
Colorado, and those suits are a small part of all personal injury litigation. Placing the 
small number of medical malpractice lawsuits on top of a denominator of opportunities 
for doctor error makes clearer just how scarce medical malpractice claims are. 
For car crashes, there are any number of possible denominators. The Federal 
Highway Administration of the United States Department of Transportation produces 
a Highway Statistics Series77 with aggregate data for each state.78 This series includes 
a number of different variables against which one might reasonably compare to the 
number of car crashes.79 For example, one might compare the number of crashes to 
 
72 Ambition, DESPAIR.COM, 
https://despair.com/collections/posters/products/ambition?variant=2457295747 
[https://perma.cc/4ZL5-CWJ8].  
73 Galanter, supra note 9, at 1099 (“We can imagine a bottom layer consisting of all the events 
in which, for example, a particular product was used or encountered.”). 
74 Id. at 1101 (beginning dispute pyramids with the “grievances” layer).  
75 Id. at 1099. 
76 See TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2006) (explaining that medical 
malpractice litigation is the exception, rather than the norm, when doctors injure patients). 
77 Highway Statistics 2018, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. [hereinafter FHWA Stat. 2018], 
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2018/ [https://perma.cc/TP9G-VFPN]. 
78 Highway Statistics Series: State Statistical Abstracts 2012—Colorado, FED. HIGHWAY 
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the state’s population or the number of driving licenses in the state.80 The more drivers 
a state has, the more crashes there would likely be. Likewise, the number of vehicle 
registrations in the state would seem to correlate with how often drivers crash cars.81 
However, neither the number of licenses nor the number of cars would take into 
account visitors from outside the state, which could make a difference in Colorado, 
which has a substantial tourism industry.82 
Another possible denominator might be the length of roadways. The Highway 
Administration collects data on “public road length,” which measures just how much 
road there is.83 Even more specific, “functional system length” also includes the total 
length of all lanes, so that a four-lane road measures twice what a two-lane road 
measures.84 But, does more road lead to more or fewer crashes?  
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration uses all these variables as 
denominators. In the series titled “Traffic Safety Facts,” NHTSA reported traffic 
fatality and injury rates per population, licensed drivers, registered motor vehicles, 
and, finally, vehicle-miles traveled.85 Doubtless, a complex multiple regression study 
incorporating all the different data is possible, though likely not comprehensible. 
Vehicle-miles traveled is the best broadest denominator for use with the number 
of car crashes as the numerator. Transportation engineers and highway departments 
use vehicle-miles traveled (“VMT”) to measure annual traffic.86 NHTSA reports 
fatalities and injuries per million VMT.87 Intuitively, the more miles cars travel, the 
more crashes one would expect. Whether creeping along in rush-hour traffic on the 
405 in Los Angeles somehow alters the correlation between crashes and miles traveled 
is not a question I am prepared to answer. 
Furthermore, VMT is the best datum for the additional layer that I propose for 
dispute pyramids generally. To understand whether many or just a few people are 
suing Walmart, one needs to know how many customers there are. The number of 




82 See generally DEAN RUNYAN ASSOCS., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TRAVEL ON COLORADO 
2000–2018P (June 2019), https://industry.colorado.com/sites/default/files/COImp%20-
%20with%20National.pdf [https://perma.cc/XXP6-E544]. 
83 FHWA Colo. Abstract 2012, supra note 78.  
84 Id. 
85 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 812806, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2017 
(2019) [hereinafter NHTSA REPORT 2017], 
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812806 [https://perma.cc/Q2RE-
MC7Z].  
86 See FHWA Stat. 2018, supra note 77 (“The FHWA uses daily vehicle-miles of travel . . . as 
the primary measure of travel activity on the Nation’s highway systems.”). See generally 
NHTSA REPORT 2017, supra note 86 (using VMT to measure vehicle-accident rates). 
87 NHTSA REPORT 2017, supra note 86, at 84.  
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VMT. Do law students often sue their law schools?88 The number of suits means 
nothing without the number of students and law schools. Likewise, with doctors sued 
for malpractice: how many patients do they treat? For every claim about the frequency 
of litigation that includes a temporal marker like “often,” “frequently,” or 
“increasingly,” an appropriate denominator is crucial. That is, researchers need to 
compute injury rates and not just the number of injury cases.  
Plaintiffs filed the lawsuits that this Article analyzes in 2015.89 Mostly, the crashes 
did not happen in 2015. Because the statute of limitations for filing an automobile-
related personal injury lawsuit is three years in Colorado,90 most of the driving that 
led to the crashes took place in 2012 and 2013. More specific detail on the time 
between injury and the filing of lawsuits is below.91 In 2012, Colorado saw 46,769 
million VMT with 46,968 million the following year.92 Averaging the two yields 
46,868 million vehicle-miles. This denominator is, of course, imperfect. Some 
plaintiffs filed their 2015 lawsuits within months of their injuries (data for time of 
filing are below), so I might instead vary the calculation of the denominator in some 
fussier way that would add nothing to the analysis.  
C. Number of Injury Crashes in Colorado 
The next empirical step is to join the roughly 46,868 million VMT to the dispute 
pyramid using the number of injury crashes. When law enforcement officers—police, 
highway patrol, sheriffs—respond to a car crash, they fill out a document called, until 
2019, a Traffic Accident Report (“TAR”).93 The report calls for a variety of 
 
88 For examples of law students suing their law schools, see Gomez-Jimenez v. N.Y.L. Sch., 
943 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012), aff'd, 956 N.Y.S.2d 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012); Harnish 
v. Widener Univ. Sch. of L., 931 F. Supp. 2d 641 (D.N.J. 2013); Austin v. Albany L. Sch. of 
Union Univ., 957 N.Y.S.2d 833 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013); Casey v. Fla. Coastal Sch. of L., Inc., 
No. 3:14-CV-01229, 2015 WL 10818746 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2015); Sixth Amended 
Complaint, Alaburda v. Thomas Jefferson Sch. of L., No. 37-2011-00091898, 2015 WL 
10634633 (Cal. Super. Oct. 20, 2015); Complaint at 4–5, Barkhordar v. Harv. Univ., No. 1:20-
CV-11203, 2020 WL 3444027 (D. Mass. June 22, 2020); Rojas v. Fla. Bd. of Governors Found., 
Inc., Filing No. 107008592 (Fla. Leon Cnty. Ct. May 4, 2020); Nathan Hale, Fla. Sued for 
Campus Fees During COVID-19 Shutdown, LAW360 (May 4, 2020), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1270285/fla-sued-for-campus-fees-during-covid-19-
shutdown [https://perma.cc/ST7Z-XWUE]. 
89 The data for car crash complaints and answers are from January through June of 2015. I 
analyzed 298 complaints and 356 answers. 
90 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-101(1)(n)(I) (2016).  
91 See infra Section III.D. 
92 Highway Statistics 2013, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. [hereinafter FHWA Statistics 2013], 
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2013/ [https://perma.cc/8DLB-
BWVK]; Highway Statistics 2012, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. [hereinafter FHWA Statistics 2012], 
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2012/ [https://perma.cc/86C9-3C2D]. 
93 See COLO. STATE TRAFFIC RECS. ADVISORY COMM., INVESTIGATING OFFICER’S TRAFFIC 
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information about the vehicles involved, the drivers, the road conditions, indications 
of alcohol or drug use, and, of course, the injuries.94 Like most law enforcement 
agencies in the United States and many throughout the world, Colorado uses a five-
point scale to code the severity of injuries.95 The National Safety Council (“NSC”) 
established the KABCO scale, as it is called, in 1966.96 For crashes with a fatality, 
police use a 4 or K for Killed; Colorado police use the numbers not the letters. Next is 
an incapacitating injury, which the police code as 3 or A. Non-incapacitating injuries 
are 2 (B); possible injuries are 1 (C); and no injury is 0 (O). Since 2012, something 
called the Minimum Model Uniform Crash Criteria (“MMUCC”) of the Federal 
Highway Administration has shifted the standard for A from “incapacitating [injury]” 
to “suspected serious injury” and for B from “non-incapacitating [injury]” to 
“suspected minor injury.”97  
With regard to statewide reporting of motor vehicle injuries, an interesting bit of 
data selection and bias by the state of Colorado emerges. The actual form that 
Colorado law enforcement officials used from 2006 to 2019 differed from the 
MMUCC and NSC language.98 Colorado’s Traffic Accident Report identified 3 (A) 
as “evident – incapacitating injury”; 2 (B) as “evident – non-incapacitating injury”; 
and 1 (C) as “complaint of injury.”99 The chief engineer for the Colorado Department 
of Transportation aggregates data from the TARs and, annually, provides monthly data 
by county for the number of fatalities, injuries, and property damage-only (“PDO”) 
accidents.100 The first category includes the 4s; the second includes 3s, 2s, and 1s, and 
the last category, with no personal injuries and damage only to property are the 0s.101 
For the period from July of 2012 through June of 2013, the chief engineer reported 
103,687 crashes for this period with 25,760 injury accidents; 438 fatalities; and 77,489 
 
ev%2007-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/W36Y-UFL9]. In 2019, the Colorado Department of 
Transportation updated the form and renamed it the Traffic Crash Report. COLO. DEP’T OF 
REVENUE, STATE OF COLORADO TRAFFIC CRASH REPORT (2019) [hereinafter COLORADO 
TRAFFIC CRASH REPORT], https://www.codot.gov/about/committees/strac/dr3447-
folder/dr3447-crash-report-official-released-form [https://perma.cc/C3WE-47UQ]. 
94 See COLORADO TRAFFIC ACCIDENT REPORTING MANUAL, supra note 93, at 14, 37, 45. 
95 Id. at 49. 
96 Beau Burdett et al., Accuracy of Injury Severity Ratings on Police Crash Reports, TRANSP. 
RSCH. REC. 58, 58–59 (2015).  
97 Id. at 59.  
98 COLORADO TRAFFIC ACCIDENT REPORTING MANUAL, supra note 93, at 14. 
99 Id. at 49. 
100 The data flow from the TARs to the Department of Revenue and thence to the Colorado 
Department of Transportation. For a description of the process for handling and cleaning the 
data, see OFF. OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER, COLO. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ANNUAL TRAFFIC ACCIDENT 
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non-injury or PDO crashes.102 The proportion of injury crashes, at 24.8% of all 
crashes, is roughly consistent with the national figure of just under 30% of crashes 
being injury crashes.103 PDO crashes are about 70% of all crashes nationally and just 
about 75% in Colorado.104  
A different division of the Colorado Department of Transportation reported lower 
figures for car crash injuries in the state: just 9,900 injury crashes for 2012 and a 
slightly lower number, 9,649, for 2013.105 The average of these two figures, 9,775, is 
just 37.9% of the Chief Engineer’s figure for injury crashes.106 The reason for the 
difference is that a Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment injury 
epidemiologist writes the report on annual injuries for the Colorado Department of 
Transportation, and she disregards injuries that law enforcement officers code as 1 or 
C on the KABCO scale.107 “Yes, that is correct,” the epidemiologist explained to me, 
“I do not count the ‘complaint of injury’ as an injury. Only evident injuries (both 
incapacitating and non-incapacitating).”108 Her published reports of just the 3s and 2s 
sometimes call these “serious injuries” and other times misleadingly suggest the 3s 
and 2s constitute all the injuries.109  
There are numerous studies comparing the KABCO evaluations of police officers 
with those of medical personnel.110 These studies confirm, unsurprisingly, that 
 
102 Id. at 7–8.  
103 There were roughly 5,615,000 crashes in the United States in 2012. There were 31,006 fatal 
crashes. 1,634,00 or 29.1% were injury crashes, and 3,950,000 or 70.3% were PDO crashes. 
FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. & FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 2015 STATUS OF THE 
NATION’S HIGHWAYS, BRIDGES, AND TRANSIT: CONDITIONS AND PERFORMANCE ES-8 (2015) 
[hereinafter FHWA 2015 STATUS REPORT], 
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/2015cpr/pdfs/2015cpr.pdf [https://perma.cc/33MA-VGPR]; 
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS, 
DOT HS 811 856, at 4 (2013) [hereinafter NHTSA 2013 TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS], 
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/811856 [https://perma.cc/44KN-
FQR4]. 
104 CDOT ANNUAL ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 100, at 7–8; NHTSA 2013 TRAFFIC SAFETY 
FACTS, supra note 103, at 4; accord FHWA 2015 STATUS REPORT, supra note 103, at ES-8. 




106 Id.; CDOT ANNUAL ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 100, at 7–8.  
107 Email on file with the author. In her report, the epidemiologist refers to and conflates 
injuries and what she calls serious injuries. CDOT PROBLEM REPORT, supra note 105, at 10–12.  
108 Email on file with author. The language concerning incapacitating and non-incapacitating 
is from earlier versions of the KABCO scale.  
109 CDOT PROBLEM REPORT, supra note 105.  
110 See, e.g., Cynthia Burch et al., A Comparison of KABCO and AIS Injury Severity Metrics 
Using CODES Linked Data, 15 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 627, 627–30 (2014); id. at 630 
(“A[bbreviated] I[njury] S[cale] codes are determined by clinical personnel who have access to 
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physicians and medical personnel do a better job at diagnosis than police, but the 
studies also show no basis for excluding KABCO Cs from the count of those 
injured.111 This Article therefore uses the chief engineer’s totals for car crash injuries 
and not the lower figure of the injury epidemiologist. 
D.  Number and Type of Personal Injury Lawsuits in Colorado 
During 2012–13, there were 25,760 motor vehicle crashes with injuries and 46,868 
million vehicle-miles traveled.112 This is 0.55 injury crashes for each million VMT. 
Car crash lawsuits may follow injury crashes. Do they usually? 
Car crash lawsuits dominate the various categories of personal injury litigation in 
Colorado.113 The same is true in other states.114 Lawyers file lawsuits online in 
 
all medical records for the individual, whereas KABCO is determined by police officers at the 
scene of the crash based on appearance and circumstances, not clinical evaluation.”); see also 
Burdett et al., supra note 96 (comparing accuracy of KABCO evaluations by law enforcement 
officers to actual health outcomes as rated by medical practitioners); Charles P. Compton, Injury 
Severity Codes: A Comparison of Police Injury Codes and Medical Outcomes as Determined 
by NASS CDS Investigators, 36 J. SAFETY RSCH. 483, 483–84 (2005) (same); Charles M. 
Farmer, Reliability of Police-Reported Information for Determining Crash and Injury Severity, 
4 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 38, 38–44 (2003) (same); K.L. Tsui et al., Misclassification of Injury 
Severity Among Road Casualties in Police Reports, 41 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 84, 
84–89 (2009) (same). 
111 Burch et al., supra note 110, at 629. 
112 CDOT ANNUAL ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 100, at 7–8; FHWA Statistics 2013, supra 
note 92, at VM-2 (5.4.1, vehicle miles of travel by functional system), 
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2013/vm2.cfm [https://perma.cc/E4RT-
7ADZ]; FHWA Statistics 2012, supra note 92, at VM-2 (same), 
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2012/vm2.cfm [https://perma.cc/FP3K-
4PPS].  
113 COLO. JUD. BRANCH, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 29 (2015) 




114 See CT. STAT. PROJECT, STATE COURT CASELOAD DIGEST: 2018 DATA 10 (2020), 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/40820/2018-Digest.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AL5L-465T] (“In the 16 states who provided a composition of tort case types 
. . . most are dominated by automobile accident cases.”); see also CHIEF ADM’R OF THE CTS., 
NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM: 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 36 (2019), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/legacypdfs/19_UCS-Annual_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/935L-
V7Y2] (reporting that of 452,414 civil filings in N.Y. State Supreme Courts in 2019, 16% were 
motor vehicle related, third to uncontested matrimonials (20.5%) and residential foreclosures 
(22%)); JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., 2019 COURT STATISTICS REPORT: STATEWIDE CASELOAD 
TRENDS 2008–09 THROUGH 2017–18, at 112 (2019), 
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2019-Court-Statistics-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/92S8-HJRK] (reporting 41,839 motor vehicle related civil filings in California 
Superior Courts, compared to 23,402 filings of all other personal injury claims); OFFICE OF CT. 
ADMIN. & TEX. JUD. COUNCIL, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY FISCAL 
YEAR 2019, at 5 (2019) https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1445760/fy-19-annual-statistical-
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Colorado, and when e-filing, the lawyer must select a case type or category for the 
litigation.115 Filing clerks sometimes confirm that the lawyer picked the right case 
type.116 Some of the non-tort case types are, for example, breach of contract, 
declaratory judgment, goods sold and delivered, note, replevin, and sexual 
harassment.117 The state’s category titles for personal injury and other tort lawsuits 
include personal injury, personal injury–motor vehicle, wrongful death, and wrongful 
death–motor vehicle.118 A separate case type called, simply, negligence, might be 
about personal injury or could be property damage.119 There is also a case type called 
property damage.120 Finally, there is a category titled malpractice, which includes 
claims against medical providers who cause personal injuries but also includes claims 
against lawyers, accountants, and architects—claims that may be solely for economic 
or property damage.121  
Because my subthesis is that car crashes dominate personal injury litigation, I have 
aggregated all the various categories of tort claims that do or might include personal 
injuries for comparison with car crash cases. The six case types in alphabetical order 
are malpractice, negligence, personal injury, personal injury–motor vehicle, wrongful 
death, and wrongful death–motor vehicle. I have not included the case types of fraud, 
property damage, or public nuisance.122 My selection of categories against which I 
compare car crash cases is overbroad or overinclusive, though not, I think, by much. 
The six categories of case types comprise Colorado’s personal injury lawsuits. For 
2015, Colorado District Courts saw total filings of 224,591 new cases of all types with 
civil filings being the largest category (101,112), followed by criminal (40,903), 
domestic relations (34,841), juvenile (24,681), and probate (15,728).123  
 
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2244-M4QW] (reporting that in all Texas courts in 2019, 55,300 
personal injury or property damage cases filed involved a motor vehicle, compared to 13,622 
injury or damage cases not involving a motor vehicle). 




116 Id. at 72. 
117 See generally COLORADO JUDICIAL STATISTICS 2015, supra note 113. 
118 Id. at 25, 27.  
119 Id. at 25.  
120 Id. at 26.  
121 Id. at 25.  
122 Fraud, though a tort, does not likely lead to personal injury. Property damage is what it 
says. And public nuisance is special—it may include personal injury but has comparatively few 
cases. Id. at 24–27. 
123 Id. at 17.  
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Personal injury lawsuits were just shy of five percent of the total number of new 
civil filings.124 The distribution of new personal injury cases in 2015 was: 
 
Table 1: 2015 Colorado Personal Injury Cases Filed 
                Personal Injury Case Types 2015 Cases Filed Percentage 
Malpractice 212 4.3% 
Negligence 450 9.1% 
Personal Injury 1,217 24.6% 
Personal Injury–Motor Vehicle 2,974 60.2% 
Wrongful Death 64 1.3% 
Wrongful Death–Motor Vehicle 27 0.5% 
Total125 4,944 100.0% 
 
As I noted above, the number of malpractice cases is tiny. My best estimate, based 
on prior research, is that roughly two-thirds of the malpractice lawsuits are filed 
against physicians—around 140 cases—hardly the reign of terror that physicians fear 
and not really enough lawsuits to allow for tort law’s regulatory function.126  
Motor vehicle injuries dominate the personal injury category with 60.2% of all 
filings. This case type, personal injury–motor vehicle, is the category of answers that 
I analyze. Wrongful death cases involving motor vehicles, which I have not included 
in my sample of answers, totaled just 27 for the year and amounted to 0.5% of all 
personal injury filings.  
The 2,974 car crash lawsuits of 2015 amounted to 2.9% of all the new civil actions 
in 2015.127 Personal injury litigation is but a small component of all civil litigation in 
Colorado—not a flood and certainly not enough to overwhelm the courts. 
Comparing the filed lawsuits with the number of injury crashes, Colorado had 
2,974 motor vehicle injury lawsuits filed in 2015 from a total of 25,760 injury car 
crashes. That is, 11.5% of injury car crashes or just under one in nine resulted in a 
 
124 Id. at 25–29. 
125 Id. 
126 BAKER, supra note 76, at 23. 
127 COLORADO JUDICIAL STATISTICS 2015, supra note 113, at 29. 
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personal injury lawsuit. Every million vehicle-miles in Colorado yielded 0.061 
personal injury lawsuits.128 
For ease of reference, then, Colorado had about 100,000 civil lawsuits in 2015 with 
5% of those being personal injury lawsuits of some sort.129 Sixty percent of all personal 
injury suits or 3% of all civil suits were car crash injury lawsuits. Coincidentally, the 
state also had just over 100,000 motor vehicle crashes with roughly one-quarter having 
injuries.130 For 88.5% of the injury car crashes, no litigation ensued. To be sure, there 
were insurance claims without litigation for an uncertain number of these injury car 
crashes, and the settlement of many of these insurance claims—without litigation—is 
the subject of Professor Engstrom’s studies.131  
Only one in nine injury car crashes yields a lawsuit. Once filed, insurance defense 
lawyers answer the complaints on behalf of the insured defendants. Parts III and IV of 
this Article discuss the work of these lawyers, nearly all of whom fall into the category 
of insurance defense mill lawyers.  
III. ANSWERS TO CAR CRASH COMPLAINTS 
The real empirical focus of this Article is on the work of insurance defense mill 
lawyers in answering complaints that lawyers file on behalf of people injured in car 
crashes. I have already shown that only about one-quarter (24.8%) of Colorado’s car 
crashes result in personal injuries.132 There is roughly one injury car crash for every 
two million VMT.133 If while biking with your friends, you pass an injury car crash on 
the highway or street in Colorado, I have shown that you can authoritatively say to 
your friends that there is just a one in nine chance that there will be a lawsuit in 
connection with the crash.134 But, what about insurance claims, your friends will ask? 
There, you can say that the data are as yet unclear.135 
 
128 This figure is consistent with Engstrom’s summary of existing empirical research. 
Engstrom, When Cars Crash, supra note 47, at 299–300 (“[O]f those who initiate claims for 
compensation, roughly half hire lawyers, while only a small proportion (11%, by one estimate) 
actually file lawsuits.”). 
129 See supra Table 1 and text accompanying notes 124–25. 
130 See supra text accompanying note 102. 
131 Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1487 (“The settlement of routine 
personal injury claims, especially when no lawsuit is initiated and trial is not a realistic 
alternative, remains poorly understood.”). 
132 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
133 See supra text accompanying note 113. 
134 See supra text accompanying note 128. 
135 Engstrom, When Cars Crash, supra note 47, at 299–300 (reporting, based upon data that 
an insurance industry research group sells, that roughly half of those injured in motor vehicle 
accidents make an informal or formal attempt to collect from another party to the accident, and 
of those who initiate claims, roughly half hire lawyers, and only 11% actually file lawsuits). 
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In the first half of 2015, plaintiffs’ lawyers filed 1,538 civil lawsuits of the case 
type “personal injury–motor vehicle” in Colorado.136 I sampled enough of these 
lawsuits to achieve a margin of error of five percent. I aimed for 300 lawsuits, which 
I selected using a random number generator from all car-crash lawsuits filed. After the 
counting was done, two suits turned out to have answers missing from the case files, 
so the sample includes 298 different lawsuits. There were two defendants in forty-
eight suits, three in nine suits, and five in one more suit, so the total number of answers 
for the 298 suits could have been as high as 357, but one answer was missing from the 
case files. This Article therefore presents an analysis of 356 answers to 298 different 
lawsuits. The 298 lawsuits are 19.4% of the total of 1,538 suits filed during the first 
six months of 2015.  
The margin of error is 5% with a 95% confidence level for this sample.137 When I 
present a number that is a description of some aspect of the answers using a 
percentage, I intend that descriptive percentage to represent the answers filed to all of 
the 1,538 lawsuits filed during the same time period. The reader, however, should 
know that my percentages should be read as plus or minus five percent. Note, however, 
that this sampling error applies only to this section of the Article. The numbers before 
this point in the Article, concerning the total number of crashes, represent the entire 
universe or population of crashes. For total miles traveled, I adopted the state of 
Colorado’s figures. 
Regarding answers, Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure 8(b) directs that “[a] party 
shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit 
or deny the averments of the adverse party.”138 As I noted in the introduction, Colorado 
Rule 8(b) offers three clear options to a defendant answering the averments of a 
complaint.139 The defendant may admit or deny the averments or state that he is 
“without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an 
averment,” which statement “has the effect of a denial.”140 For each allegation, then, 
the answer is yes, no, or I don’t know. 
The late Judge Milton Shadur, Federal District Court Judge for the Northern 
District of Illinois, is the hero of this story.141 Discussing Rule 8(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge Shadur noted:  
 
136 See COLORADO JUDICIAL STATISTICS 2015, supra note 113, at 29. 
137 Margin of Error, STAT TREK, 
https://stattrek.com/statistics/dictionary.aspx?definition=margin%20of%20error 
[https://perma.cc/NVS3-63SD]. 
138 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b). Similarly, FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1) directs that “[i]n responding to a 
pleading, a party must: (A) state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted 
against it; and (B) admit or deny the allegations asserted against it by an opposing party.” 
Colorado uses the term averment while the federal rules use allegation and claim. 
139 See supra text accompanying notes 3–4. 
140 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b). FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(5) directs that “[a] party that lacks knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of an allegation must so state, and the 
statement has the effect of a denial.” 
141 Thomas D. Russell, Disrupting Frivolous Defenses, 52 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 911 (2021) 
(Article at Part II), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3805181; Tony 
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Even though the second sentence of Rule 8(b) marks out an unambiguous 
path for any party that seeks the benefit of a deemed denial when he, she or 
it can neither admit outright nor deny outright a plaintiff's allegation (or 
plaintiff's “averment,” the word used in Rule 8(b)), too many lawyers, feel a 
totally unwarranted need to attempt to be creative by straying from that clear 
path.142  
Judge Shadur’s order and accompanying appendix in State Farm v. Riley are the 
models that I hope the state court judges in Colorado and other states will adopt 
regarding answers by insurance defense mill lawyers.143  
Of course, Judge Shadur wrote regarding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Colorado’s Rule 8 is essentially identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, though 
slightly different in form and organization. As noted above, Colorado still uses the 
word “averment,” but Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 now uses “allegation” or 
“claim.”144 These words are interchangeable. Colorado’s Rule of Civil Procedure 
directs the defendant to “admit or deny the averments of the adverse party,”145 and 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 directs that the “party must . . . admit or deny the 
allegations asserted against it by an opposing party.”146 Notably, Colorado’s Rule 8 
does not limit the averments to which a defendant must respond to only those “asserted 
against it.”147 The federal rule creates a separate subsection (b)(5) for what a party 
lacking knowledge or information should do: “[a] party that lacks knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of an allegation must so state, 
and the statement has the effect of a denial.”148 Colorado’s Rule 8(b) uses “shall” 
instead of “must” in a sentence that immediately follows the direction to admit or deny 
averments: “If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to 
the truth of an averment, he shall so state and this has the effect of a denial.”149 One 
difference between the rules is that the Colorado rule puts the “effect of failure to 
deny” in a separate section (d) rather than within (b), whereas the federal rule includes 
the “Effect of Failing to Deny” in 8(b)(6). Perhaps the most meaningful distinction 
between Colorado’s Rule 8(b) and the corresponding federal rule concerns general 
 
Briscoe, Milton Shadur, Federal Judge Who Oversaw Key Cases Involving Chicago Schools, 
Cook County Jail, Dies, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 16, 2018), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/obituaries/ct-met-milton-shadur-obituary-20180116-
story.html; Shadur, Milton I., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/shadur-
milton-irving (last visited May 26, 2021). 
142 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 278 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
143 See generally id.; Russell, supra note 141. 
144 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1). 
145 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b). 
146 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(B). 
147 Id. 
148 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(5). 
149 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b). 
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denials. Both rules allow but do not encourage general denials. Colorado’s rule 
specifically points to Rule 11 as a sanction for a party improperly pleading a general 
denial.150 
Colorado appellate courts repeatedly have acknowledged that “when the Colorado 
and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are essentially identical, case law interpreting 
the federal rule is persuasive in analysis of the Colorado rule.”151 Because Colorado’s 
Rule 8(b) is largely identical to corresponding federal rule, Colorado judges might 
readily adopt Judge Shadur’s view that lawyers for defendants should answer 
according to the federal rules. And, because thirty or more states pattern their rules of 
civil procedure after the federal rules, the same principles apply in most states.152 
In an appendix to his Memorandum Opinion and Order in State Farm v. Riley, 
Judge Shadur singled out for criticism several different patterns of answer abuse that 
he observed.153 Judge Shadur complained that “too many lawyers” strayed from Rule 
8(b)’s “unambiguous path” for deemed denials.154 “[S]ome members of the same 
coterie of careless defense counsel,” Judge Shadur noted, demand “‘strict proof,’ 
whatever that may mean.”155 “Strict proof,” the judge noted, “is nowhere to be found 
in the Rules (or to this Court’s knowledge in any other set of rules or in any treatise 
on the subject of pleading).”156 Judge Shadur also singled out in his appendix the 
refusal to respond to “legal conclusions”;157 the claim that a document “Speaks for 
Itself”;158 and any other failure or refusal to answer an allegation.159 Judge Shadur also 
addressed Rule 8(c) and the topic of affirmative defenses in his appendix, which issue 
I address below. 
 
 
150 If the pleader “does . . . intend to controvert all its averments, including averments of the 
grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends, he may do so by general denial subject to 
the obligations set forth in Rule 11.” COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b). But see Lewis v. Buckskin Joe’s, 
Inc., 396 P.2d 933, 939 (Colo. 1964) (“Rule 8(b), [COLO. R. CIV. P.] 8(b), outlines procedures 
to be followed in pleading defenses. Needless to say, the rule contemplates an answer that 
speaks the truth. The record here clearly demonstrates that none of the eleven above-mentioned 
denials has any foundation in fact. Compliance with Rule 11, [COLO. R. CIV. P.] 11, should be 
had in all pleadings. The general denial should not have been filed.”). 
151 See, e.g., Forbes v. Goldenhersh, 899 P.2d 246, 249 (Colo. App. 1994).  
152 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
153 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 278–80 (N.D. Ill. 2001). For an 
extensive analysis of the appendix, see Russell, supra note 141, at 922. 
154 State Farm, 199 F.R.D. at 278. 
155 Id.  
156 Id.  
157 Id.  
158 Id. at 279.  
159 Id.  
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A. Legal Conclusions 
In nearly one-third (32.6%) of the answers (116 of 356), Colorado’s insurance 
defense lawyers claimed that they need not respond to any allegation that called for a 
legal conclusion. Judge Shadur would be angry.160  
There is no basis in either the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure for the defense attorneys’ refusal to reply to an allegation by 
claiming that it calls for a legal conclusion.161 Once again, Rule 8(b) provides the 
option of admitting or denying.162 The defendant may also state that he or she lacks 
sufficient information—if that’s the truth, and the rules deem the allegation denied. 
Judge Shadur explained that:  
 
Another regular offender is the lawyer who takes it on himself or herself to decline 
to respond to an allegation because it “states a legal conclusion.” That of course 
violates the express Rule 8(b) requirement that all allegations must be responded 
to. But perhaps even more importantly, it disregards established law from the 
highest authority on down that legal conclusions are an integral part of the federal 
notice pleading regime . . . .163 
 
Judge Shadur’s point concerning legal conclusions is distinct from the well-known 
Iqbal and Twombly issues.164 Together, Iqbal and Twombly make clear that a 
plaintiff’s allegations may not be purely conclusory. A car crash plaintiff may not 
simply plead that the defendant was negligent. The plaintiff must plead “enough facts 
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”165 However, along with those 
facts, the plaintiff may plead legal conclusions.  
Colorado’s insurance defense mill lawyers fall into Judge Shadur’s category of 
“regular offender” with their answers to allegations that include legal conclusions. A 
good example of the nearly one-third of answers that include such a claim is defense 
attorney Andrew LaFontaine, Esq., of the firm of Stuart S. Jorgensen & Associates, in 
his answer in a simple, one-plaintiff, one-defendant car crash claim.166 Jorgensen & 
Associates are employees of State Farm Insurance and defend State Farm insureds.167 
 
160 See Russell, supra note 141, at Sections VII.B, VIII.B, and IX.B. 
161 State Farm, 199 F.R.D. at 278. 
162 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b). 
163 State Farm, 199 F.R.D. at 278. 
164 See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (discussing federal pleading 
requirements); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (discussing federal pleading 
requirements).  
165 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.  
166 Answer and Jury Demand at 1, para. 5, Witman v. Kraus, No. 2015CV30800 (Colo. Dist. 
Ct. May 28, 2015) (Denver Cnty.) [hereinafter Witman Answer]. 
167 Stuart Jorgensen & Associates: State Farm Insurance, BUZZFILE, 
http://www.buzzfile.com/business/State-Farm-Insurance-303-657-2078 
[https://perma.cc/3ZGQ-RN9K]. The Rules of Professional Conduct require firms in which the 
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Jorgensen & Associates answered 6.8% (25 of the 356) complaints in this study’s 
sample. In response to one plaintiff’s allegation that “[j]urisdiction and venue are 
appropriate pursuant to C.R.S. § 13-1-124 and C.R.C.P., Rule 98(c)(5),” Mr. 
LaFontaine answered: “[c]alls for a legal conclusion.”168 This response has no 
meaning or utility even to Mr. LaFontaine. The defense mill attorney then stated that 
“[j]urisdiction and venue are not presently disputed.”169 That being so, why comment 
on the legal conclusion? For good measure, Mr. LaFontaine then added “[d]enied in 
all other respects.”170 But there’s nothing left to deny. Mr. LaFontaine might have 
simply answered “Admit” in response to the plaintiff’s pleading of jurisdiction and 
venue. 
Other insurance defense mill lawyers offer more extensive objections to the 
pleading of legal conclusions. Nina Hammon Jahn, Esq., is a senior trial attorney for 
American Family Insurance.171 Like the attorneys at Jorgensen & Associates, Ms. Jahn 
is an employee of the insurer—an in-house attorney for American Family.172 Her 
answer includes her email address using the amfam.com domain.173 Her office 
answered 4.9% of this study’s complaints. There is no pretense, as with the firm name 
Stuart S. Jorgensen & Associates, to being anything other than an insurance defense 
mill lawyer. In her three-page answer to a relatively simple four-page complaint 
against two defendants, Ms. Jahn amply refuses to respond to allegations that she 
identifies as including legal conclusions.174 In her answer, which she filed on behalf 
of a driver for a transport firm, Ms. Jahn states that “[w]ith regard to paragraphs 4, 5, 
8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 26 and 27 of the Plaintiff’s Complaint, 
Defendant does not respond as the allegations contained in these paragraphs calls [sic] 
 
insurance defense lawyers are employees of the insurers to be clear about their “captive” status. 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., W. WILLIAM HODES & PETER R. JARVIS, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 
59.15 (4th ed. Supp. 2020-2) (“Although the majority of courts addressing the issue agree that 
‘captive law firm’ arrangements are not per se improper, there is almost universal agreement 
that the law firms may not hold themselves out as ‘normal’ law firms, but must indicate on their 
letterhead and other professional designations that the lawyers practicing in the firm are 
employees of the carrier, not partners or members of an independent law firm.”). 
168 Witman Answer, supra note 166, at 1, para. 5; Complaint for Damages and Jury Demand 
para. 5, at 1, Witman v. Kraus, No. 2015CV30800 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mar. 5, 2015) (Denver Cnty.). 
169 Witman Answer, supra note 166, at 1, para. 5. 
170 Id. 
171 Nina Hammon Jahn, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/nina-hammon-jahn-
2646a14a/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2021). 
172 Id. 
173  Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 1, Anthony v. Transport Oh, No. 2015CV30639 
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Sept. 8, 2015) (Boulder Cnty.), Filing ID No. 8016DD52BB577 [hereinafter 
Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint]. 
174 Id. at 1, para. 4. 
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for a conclusion of law.”175 The complaint included thirty-one allegations.176 
American Family’s attorney refused to answer fifteen of them because the allegations 
called, she claimed, for “a conclusion of law.”177 What is Ms. Jahn complaining 
about? 
American Family’s lawyer first objected to a simple allegation about venue. 
Plaintiff alleged that “Venue is proper in Boulder County, the county of residence of 
Defendant Transport Oh.”178 Ms. Jahn is correct that venue is a legal conclusion, 
though she is incorrect that she need not respond to legal conclusions.179 Colorado 
Rule of Civil Procedure 98(c)(1) specifies that “an action shall be tried in the county 
in which the defendants, or any of them, may reside at the commencement of the 
action.”180 The plaintiff therefore properly and crisply pleaded the residence of the 
defendant transport company.181 Ms. Jahn regarded the entire allegation as tainted by 
the legal conclusion of venue and simply ignored the factual allegation that “Transport 
Oh” resided in Boulder County.182 By failing to deny that or any part of an allegation, 
Ms. Jahn admitted the allegation, as Rule 8 makes clear that “[a]verments in a pleading 
to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of 
damage, are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading.”183 But one doubts 
that the defense lawyer would agree that she had admitted anything. 
Ms. Jahn next refused to answer the plaintiff’s allegation that “Jurisdiction is 
proper in District Court, a court of general jurisdiction.”184 This is folly. A judge who 
cared might take offense.  
After refusing to respond to the legal conclusions that the plaintiff pleaded 
regarding venue and subject matter jurisdiction, Ms. Jahn refused to respond to the 
plaintiff’s paragraph eight that “[a]t all relevant times hereto, Mr. Malvaes-Ortiz was 
operating the International [truck] in the course and scope of his employment and for 
the benefit of his employer, Transport Oh.”185 Without using the legal words vicarious 
liability nor the Latin words respondeat superior, the plaintiff’s attorney was properly 
pleading facts sufficient to establish that the plaintiff was on the job when the crash 
 
175 Id.  
176 See generally Complaint and Jury Demand, Anthony, No. 2015CV30639 [hereinafter 
Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand]. 
177 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4. 
178 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, para. 4, at 1. 
179 See supra text accompanying note 158.  
180 COLO. R. CIV. P. 98(c)(1). 
181 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 1, para. 4. 
182 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4. 
183 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(d). 
184 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4; Anthony 
Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 1, para. 5. 
185 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 2, para. 8. 
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involving the International truck happened. As above, Ms. Jahn throws the “legal 
conclusion” blanket over the entire allegation.186 She does not stop to admit, for 
example, that the plaintiff worked for Transport Oh. But of course, what is an 
allegation of employment if not a “legal conclusion?” 
Ms. Jahn next objected to a trio of allegations that the plaintiff’s lawyer set forth 
in an effort to establish the defendant driver’s negligence per se. First, the plaintiff’s 
lawyer alleged that “[a]t the time of the collision, C.R.S. § 42-4-1008 was in full force 
and effect.”187 Ms. Jahn refused to answer this allegation because, she claimed, it’s a 
legal conclusion.188 Parsing the language, is the legal conclusion “at the time of the 
collision,” “full force,” or full “effect”?  
There was a legitimate basis on which Ms. Jahn might complain about the 
plaintiff’s attempt to invoke section 1008 of the Motor Vehicle Code. Section 1008, 
which is titled “following too closely,” specifies that “[t]he driver of a motor vehicle 
shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent.”189 As I 
teach my torts students, statutes that prescribe “reasonable” behavior are not 
candidates for plaintiffs’ lawyers pleading negligence per se.190 A panel of Colorado’s 
Court of Appeals had made this exact point with regard to section 1008 just four 
months before Ms. Jahn filed her answer. For the court of appeals, Judge Hawthorne 
held that “[w]here, as with sections 42-4-1008 and 42-4-1101, the statutory standard 
of care codifies common law negligence, a negligence per se instruction is redundant 
when given alongside a common law negligence instruction.”191 The attorney for the 
plaintiff had been careless, in my view, in pleading a statute that prescribed 
“reasonable” conduct in order to establish negligence per se. Rather than take 
advantage of this pleading error, the defense mill attorney simply refused to respond 
to an allegation she (or perhaps her paralegal) saw as calling for a legal conclusion.  
Ms. Jahn next refused to respond at all to allegations that included facts the 
plaintiff’s lawyer presented in order to prove, however misguidedly, the elements of 
negligence per se.192 The plaintiff’s lawyer pleaded that the driver of the International 
truck had “breached the duty of care” that section 1008 imposed “by following [the 
plaintiff] Mr. Anthony too closely so as to be unable to stop, by colliding into Mr. 
Anthony, by failing to recognize and adjust for the speed of vehicles ahead, and by 
failing to slow and stop for traffic stopped upon the roadway.”193 The defense mill 
 
186 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4. 
187 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 2, para. 12. Other insurance 
defense mill attorneys would avoid answering by claiming that the statute speaks for itself. See 
infra Section III.C. 
188 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4. 
189 COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1008(1) (1995). 
190 ROBERTSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 100; JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 
82 (6th ed. 2018). 
191 Winkler v. Shaffer, 356 P.3d 1020, 1024 (Colo. App. 2015). 
192 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4. 
193 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 2, para. 14. 
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attorney simply brushed away all these factual allegations because she spotted an 
embedded legal conclusion that apparently tainted the entire allegation. Likewise, Ms. 
Jahn refused to answer the next allegation, which stated that the plaintiff “was a 
member of the class the statute was intended to protect, and suffered the type of harm 
the statute was intended to prevent.”194 
As should be becoming clear, the plaintiff’s claim was for having been rear-ended 
by Mr. Malvaes-Ortiz, who was driving the International truck for Transport Oh.195 
In Colorado, as elsewhere, the law presumes a driver who rear-ends another vehicle 
to be at fault. Colorado’s jury instruction is:  
When a driver of a motor vehicle hits another vehicle in the rear, the law 
presumes [, and you must find,] that the driver was negligent.196 
Ms. Jahn repeats the claim that a legal conclusion allows her not to answer another 
four allegations related to a separate negligence per se claim.197 She refuses to admit 
the existence of the statute, ignores facts the plaintiff alleges about the crash, and 
refuses to admit either that the plaintiff or his injuries fell within the ambit of the 
statute’s protection.198 Again, in my view, and I believe that of the court of appeals, 
the plaintiff’s lawyer’s use of a statute concerning “following too closely”199 would 
not support negligence per se.200 That does not mean, however, that Ms. Jahn was free 
to ignore the pleaded facts as she did. 
Continuing, American Family Insurance’s lawyer deploys the “calls for a legal 
conclusion” claim an additional four times in her answer in order to avoid answering 
the plaintiff’s allegations.201 In paragraph twenty-two, the plaintiff’s lawyer properly 
pleaded that “[a]t all times relevant hereto, [Defendant] Mr. Malvaes-Ortiz had a 
common law duty to act with reasonable care.”202 Ms. Jahn’s refusal to answer this 
allegation is a good example of the silly wastefulness of the “calls for a conclusion of 
law” claim.203 The allegation properly calls for a legal conclusion, and the simple 
proposition that the defendant, while driving a truck, had a duty of reasonable care is 
 
194 Id. at 3, para. 20; Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 
4. 
195 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 2, para. 10. 
196 COLO. JURY INSTRS. FOR CIV. TRIALS 11:12 (bracketed text in original). 
197 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4. 
198 Id.  
199 COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1008 (1995). 
200 Winkler v. Shaffer, 356 P.3d 1020, 1024 (Colo. App. 2015). 
201 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4. 
202 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 3, para. 22. 
203 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4. 
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indisputable under Colorado law.204 Anyone driving a car has at least a duty of 
reasonable care to others on the road; this is not even an interesting—let alone 
disputable—issue.205 There is not only no basis under Rule 8 to refuse to respond to 
this allegation asking the defendant to admit the existence of a duty of reasonable care, 
there is no good faith legal argument against the existence of a duty.206 
The insurance defense mill lawyer extends her refusal to answer because the 
plaintiff alleges a legal conclusion following the allegation about duty. As noted, the 
plaintiff’s lawyer pleaded negligence per se using two different Colorado statutes—
one for following too closely and the other for careless driving. Leaving aside the 
unsuitability of those two statutes as a basis for negligence per se claims, the plaintiff’s 
lawyer pleads the same factual predicates in his straight negligence claim.207 For my 
students, I call this wearing suspenders and a belt—one pleads negligence together 
with negligence per se in order to be sure that one’s pants stay up should either the 
belt or suspenders fail.208 So, the lawyer pleaded that the defendant driver breached 
his duty of care “by following Mr. Anthony too closely so as to be unable to stop, by 
colliding into Mr. Anthony, by failing to recognize and adjust for the speed of vehicles 
ahead, and by failing to slow and stop for traffic stopped upon the roadway.”209 
Personally, I would have separated the factual claims into individual allegations. Ms. 
Jahn answered by claiming that the allegation of the legal conclusion gave her license 
to refuse to answer and thereby ignore the factual claims of the remainder of the 
allegation.210  
Continuing, the defense lawyer twice more spotted a call for a legal conclusion 
and refused to answer the allegations at all.211 The plaintiff’s lawyer again sought to 
establish vicarious liability and pleaded that “[a]t all relevant times, Jesus Malvaes-
Ortiz was acting in the course and scope of his employment and for the benefit of 
Transport Oh.”212 This is nearly a word-for-word repetition of paragraph 8. “Acting in 
the course and scope” does indeed call for a legal conclusion. For that matter, so does 
the word “employment.” If there existed an actual factual dispute about whether the 
driver was working for the company or on the job at the time of the crash, then of 
 
204 Hesse v. McClintic, 176 P.3d 759, 762 (Colo. 2008) (“McClintic, like all drivers, was under 
a duty to drive with reasonable care under the circumstances. This is the duty that attaches to 
every driver when he or she goes on the road, and we have so held for almost half a century.”). 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 3, para. 23. 
208 See, e.g., ONCE UPON A TIME IN THE WEST (Paramount Pictures 1968) (“How can you trust 
a man that wears both a belt and suspenders? Man can't even trust his own pants.” (Henry Fonda 
as Frank)).  
209 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 3, para. 19. 
210 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4. 
211 Id. 
212 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 3, para. 26. 
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course the defense lawyer should object. In this instance, though, Ms. Jahn was doing 
nothing more than being obstructive in claiming that the allegation called for a legal 
conclusion that she need not answer. Likewise, in the next paragraph, the Plaintiff’s 
lawyer pleaded that “Transport Oh, as master, bears liability for the acts of Jesus 
Malvaes-Ortiz, its servant.”213 Plaintiff having sought a legal conclusion, the insurance 
defense mill lawyer refused to answer just as she had for half of the allegations in the 
complaint.214 
Professor Engstrom identifies interview sources at the settlement mill law firms 
using only initials to preserve their confidentiality, and she uses real initials only with 
permission of the interviewees.215 This shrouds her articles in cloak-and-dagger 
secrecy, as if she is concealing the identity of CIA assets. Professor Engstrom 
discovered that settlement mill attorneys often were hesitant to speak with her, which 
she attributed partially to their fear that they had violated professional standards.216 In 
this piece, I do not hide or anonymize the names of the insurance defense mill lawyers 
who sign their names to and file pleadings that often ignore the Colorado Rules of 
Civil Procedure, that may also contravene the Colorado Rules of Professional 
Conduct, and that ultimately, in my opinion, serve neither the interests of their clients 
nor justice. Their answers are public records.217 If I had interviewed informants, I 
adopt Professor Engstrom’s approach. 
Ms. Jahn’s use of the “legal conclusion” canard is extreme and very tedious for 
this Article’s gentle reader. Consider how much more tedious and aggravating 
encountering such obstructive answers is for the plaintiff’s lawyer! The fundamental 
purpose of complaints is to establish the facts and arguments that are in dispute.218 
Defense obfuscation frustrates the purpose of pleading, increases the cost of litigation, 
and slows resolution—which is the defense’s goal. This tactic serves the interest of 
the insurance company. Insureds—who pay premiums in order to have the insurer 
handle claims against them—might prefer a different approach. 
More typical of the way insurance defense mill lawyers used the “legal conclusion” 
shield in nearly one-third of their answers is the refuse/deny strategy. Aliseda & 
Associates, on behalf of Fred Loya Insurance, answered 4.1% of the complaints in this 
 
213 Id. at 3, para. 27. 
214 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4. 
215 Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1488 n.13 (using initials to maintain 
the anonymity of settlement mill attorneys who admitted to spending little time and effort on 
the cases they resolved); Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 14, at 810 (again, using initials to 
maintain the anonymity of settlement mill attorneys who were expected to quickly settle cases).  
216 Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1515. 
217 See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
218 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 5 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1202, 
Westlaw FPP (database updated April 2021) (“Historically, pleadings have served four major 
functions: (1) giving notice of the nature of a claim or defense; (2) stating the facts each party 
believes to exist; (3) narrowing the issues that must be litigated; and (4) providing a means for 
speedy disposition of sham claims and insubstantial defenses.”). 
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sample.219 Robert Holcomb, Esq., an Aliseda lawyer, has a pattern with regard to legal 
conclusions. First, he notes that “Paragraph [__] of the Complaint contains a legal 
conclusion to which no response is required.”220 Next, Mr. Holcomb states that “To 
the extent a response is required, Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph [__] of the Complaint.”221 He deployed this formulation in response to 
allegations concerning mixed pleading of conclusions and law concerning jurisdiction, 
venue, breach, and negligence per se in a rear-end crash lawsuit that Steven Zapiler, 
Esq., filed.222 He uses this language in his other answers as well.223 
The exact language that Mr. Holcomb uses in his refuse/deny responses is common 
in answers. The Law Office of Chad A. Atkins, a Liberty Mutual Insurance defense 
mill whose answers were 4.4% of the sample, responds: “The allegations contained in 
paragraphs 17 and 22 of Plaintiff’s Complaint call for a legal conclusion and, 
therefore, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant 
denies the allegations.”224 The firm of Harris, Karstaedt, Jamison & Powers, P.C., 
responds to allegations that include a legal conclusion by answering “The allegations 
contained in paragraph [__] of Plaintiffs’ Complaint seek a legal conclusion to which 
Defendants are not required to respond. To the extent a response is necessary, 
Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.”225 
Harris, Karstaedt, a firm that defends on behalf of several different insurers, answered 
2.2% of the complaints in the sample.226 Lasater & Martin uses nearly identical 
language.227  
 
219 See supra text accompanying notes 136–137. 
220 Answer and Jury Demand at 1, paras. 1–2, Gilady v. Rodriguez, No. 2015CV31311 (Colo. 
Dist. Ct. June 10, 2015) (Denver Cnty.). 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 3, paras. 19–20, Faris v. Rubio, No. 
2015CV32115 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 30, 2015) (Denver Cnty.); Answer and Jury Demand at 3, 
paras. 22–25, LaMaster v. Lopez-Saucedo, No. 2015CV31948 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 14, 2015) 
(Denver Cnty.); Answer and Jury Demand at 2, paras. 15, 17–18, Vargas v. Villaobos-
Rodriguez, No. 2015CV31503 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 15, 2015) (El Paso Cnty.); Answer and Jury 
Demand at 3, paras. 19–[23], Sanchez v. Johnson, No. 2015CV31337 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Sept. 18, 
2015) (Denver Cnty.) (paragraph 23 misnumbered as 20). 
224 Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 1, para. 5, Lor v. Cano, No. 2015CV30992 (Colo. 
Dist. Ct. Aug 3, 2015) (Adams Cnty.). 
225 Defendants Clyde Coffman and Rocky Top Resources, Inc.’s Answer to Complaint by 
Aaron Wedemeyer and Darin Wedemeyer and Request for Trial by Jury at 3, paras. 19–20, 25–
26, Wedemeyer v. Coffman, No. 2015CV31363 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 10, 2015) (El Paso Cnty.) 
[hereinafter Wedemeyer Answer]. 
226 See supra text accompanying notes 136137.  
227 Defendant Sergio Delarosa Moreno’s Answer and Jury Demand para. 8 at 2, Marshall v. 
Moreno, No. 2015CV31358 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 17, 2015) (Denver Cnty.). 
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Only one defense lawyer offers any explanation as to why he believes there is no 
need to answer an allegation calling for a legal conclusion, and his explanation is 
laughable. On behalf of Joseph Conway, a GEICO insured, Robert Ingram, Esq., 
answered.228 Mr. Ingram is an insurance mill defense lawyer who included a 
geico.com email address on his answer.229 He works for Elizabeth A. Kleger & 
Associates, which is in-house counsel for GEICO.230 The plaintiff’s lawyer, Chad 
Hemmat, Esq., from Anderson, Hemmat & McQuinn, LLC, attempted to establish the 
predicate for negligence per se by pleading both the existence of several statutes and 
that these statutes were in effect at the time of the crash.231 Mr. Ingram answered that 
“[w]ith respect to the allegations contained in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the plaintiff’s 
Complaint, they contain legal conclusions, which the Defendant Joseph A. Conway is 
neither qualified, nor required to respond to.”232 There is a strange fiction in pleading, 
in writing and responding to motions, and also in writing orders and opinions, in which 
lawyers and judges write that “the Plaintiff” or “the Defendant” argues various points, 
but of course the lawyers, not the parties, are the one doing the arguing. The plaintiff, 
for example, never argues res ipsa loquitur; her lawyer does. In answering on behalf 
of Mr. Conway, though, Mr. Ingram took that fiction a bit too far and forgot that 
though his client was not qualified to respond, Mr. Ingram was. And, Rule 8 required 
an answer. 
Why the refuse/deny answer is aggravating may not be evident. Refusing to answer 
because an allegation asks for a legal conclusion is, first, contrary to the rules. Second, 
defense lawyers sometimes couple their refusal to answer with a declaration that, if 
forced to answer, the allegation is denied. This answer is useless to the plaintiff unless 
the judge forces the defense lawyer to answer, which will happen only if the plaintiff 
files a motion with the court, awaits the defendant’s counsel response, and then files 
a reply. Then, after some waiting, maybe the lawyers attend a hearing. All of this is 
costly in money and time to everyone, plus judges get mad about this sort of thing. 
The simplest solution is for defense attorneys to keep doing what they are doing 
because they are getting away with it, or they could follow the rules and simply deny, 
admit, or say that they have insufficient information on which to form a belief. 
Defeating frivolous defenses takes considerable effort.  
B.  Directed at Codefendant  
Another tactic that the insurance defense mill lawyers learn after law school is to 
not admit information concerning a defendant other than their client. No rule or 
privilege authorizes this evasion.  
 
228 Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 1, Baca v. Conway, No. 2015CV31119 (Colo. 
Dist. Ct. May 5, 2015) (Denver Cnty.) [hereinafter Baca Answer]. But see Answer to Amended 
Complaint and Jury Demand at 1, Baca, No. 2015CV31119. Plaintiff later filed an amended 
complaint to which a different attorney responded. 
229 Baca Answer, supra note 228, at 1. 
230 Id. 
231 Complaint and Jury Demand at 3, paras. 13–15, Baca, No. 2015CV31119. 
232 Baca Answer, supra note 228, at 2, para. 5. 
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In 54 of the 356 answers, the insurance defense lawyers refused to answer 
allegations because they claimed the plaintiffs directed the allegations at another 
defendant. Of course, not every answer was to a complaint with multiple defendants. 
One hundred twelve of the answers were in lawsuits that included multiple defendants. 
The fifty-four refusals to respond to allegations directed at other defendants amounted 
to 48.2% of all the answers in multidefendant cases. Regarding the slightly more than 
half of answers that did not include a refusal to answer an allegation directed at a 
codefendant, I did not code these complaints to determine whether there were 
allegations directed at more than one defendant.  
There is no basis in the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure for the refusal to reply 
to an allegation because the insurance lawyer answering for a defendant believes that 
the allegation was not directed at his or her client. Indeed, as noted above, Colorado’s 
Rule 8 does not limit the allegations to which a defendant must respond to only those 
“asserted against it.” This is a slight difference from the federal rule.233 Once again, 
Rule 8(b) provides the option of admitting or denying.234 With regard to any allegation 
about which an individual defendant has no knowledge, Rule 8(b) provides that the 
defendant may say that he or she lacks sufficient information or knowledge to form a 
belief.235 However, Rule 8(b) does not include the option of a defendant saying: “I 
don’t think you directed your question at me, and so I will not answer even though I 
may have sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny.” If the plaintiff 
alleges something about another defendant, then the answering defendant can admit, 
deny, or say he or she does not know. Rule 8, as Judge Shadur noted, is simple. 
Just as a defendant cannot refuse to respond to an allegation because the allegation 
concerns another party, there is also no basis to refuse to answer if the allegation 
concerns a nonparty.  
Plaintiffs are entitled to use the complaint to explore what a defendant knows in 
order to “narrow[] the issues that must be litigated” and to “provid[e] a means for 
speedy disposition of sham claims and insubstantial defenses.”236 That’s the whole 
idea! Any defendant may have information concerning what other people or 
companies involved were doing. Of course, the plaintiff gets to explore that 
information.  
Smart plaintiffs’ lawyers properly use complaints to exploit conflicts between 
defendants. A plaintiff’s lawyer who knows or suspects that one defendant knows 
incriminating information about a codefendant should seek to gain admissions 
concerning that information with the complaint. For example, one defendant may have 
been driving a car while pulling on a bottle of Jack Daniels, and the second defendant 
may have been riding shotgun and perhaps adding to the negligence by encouraging 
the driver to speed. The lawyer for the plaintiff may of course expect both the driver 
and the passenger to admit that the driver had been drinking Jack Daniels while 
driving. The passenger does not get to squirm away from answering. Pitting the 
defendants against each other is a basic and acceptable tactic in multiple-defendant 
 
233 See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text. 
234 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b). 
235 Id. 
236 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 218, § 1202.  
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cases. The plaintiff should not be put to the expense of written discovery or a 
deposition to gain the passenger’s admission of this elementary detail. 
A defense mill attorney’s use of the evasive claim that she or he need not answer 
when the plaintiff’s lawyer directs an allegation at another person is puzzling at best 
but more often infuriating. The lawsuit that emerged from a multivehicle crash on 
December 17, 2012, offers a good example.237 Wayne Jacobs was a Colorado 
Department of Corrections prisoner.238 Michael Klinger, a Department of Corrections 
employee, was transporting Mr. Jacobs in a van.239 Juan Cardenas, an employee of 
Superior Sheet Metals Corporation, crashed his employer’s 2004 International Truck 
into a different driver’s 2000 Ford pickup, and then Mr. Klinger crashed the prison 
van into the truck Mr. Cardenas was driving.240 The prisoner, Mr. Jacobs, sued Mr. 
Cardenas, his employer Superior Sheet Metals, Mr. Klinger, and the Department of 
Corrections.241  
The law firm of Senter Goldfarb & Rice, LLC, filed the answer for Mr. Cardenas 
and Superior Sheet Metals.242 Senter Goldfarb, which filed 2.5% of the answers in the 
sample,243 deflected the allegations the prisoner’s attorney directed at the Department 
of Corrections and its van driver. Why? Senter Goldfarb’s attorneys, Billy-George 
Hertzke, Esq., and Jessica R. Schultz, Esq., answered that “[t]he allegations in 
paragraphs 16, 17, and 18 of Plaintiff’s Complaint are not directed at Defendants; 
therefore, no response is required.”244 There being no law supporting their claim that 
“no response is required,” the insurance defense mill attorneys cited no law. The 
allegations they claimed not to have to answer included all the elements of the 
plaintiff’s case against the codefendant. The plaintiff’s lawyer pleaded that Mr. 
Klinger and the Department of Corrections had a duty “to operate the DOC vehicle in 
a safe and prudent manner,” that Mr. Klinger failed to keep “an eye for problems 
around him,” that Mr. Klinger “failed to slow down with due regard to traffic 
conditions,” and that “he failed to keep a look out.”245 The allegations further claimed 
that Mr. Klinger breached the duty of care and caused the plaintiff’s injuries.246 The 
 
237 Complaint at 1, para. 1, Jacobs v. Superior Precision Sheet Metal Corp., No. 2015CV31295 
(Colo. Dist. Ct. May 6, 2015) (El Paso Cnty.) [hereinafter Jacobs Complaint]. 
238 Id. at 1, para. 2. 
239 Id. at 1, para. 3. 
240 Id. at 2, paras. 4–6. 
241 Id. at 1. 
242 Answer of Defendants Micro Metals, Inc. and Juan Cardenas at 1, Jacobs, No. 
2015CV31295, Filing ID No. 930145EB80411 [hereinafter Jacobs Answer]. 
243 See supra text accompanying notes 136137.  
244 Jacobs Answer, supra note 242, at 2, para. 6. 
245 Jacobs Complaint, supra note 237, at 3, para. 16. 
246 Id. at 3, para. 17. 
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allegations then listed, in a very general way, some of the injuries.247 Instead of the 
general denial of the plaintiff’s allegations against the codefendant, the Senter 
Goldfarb attorneys might have used the answer to support the codefendant’s liability. 
They might have simply admitted the undisputable matter of law that the Department 
of Corrections driver had a duty of reasonable care, and Senter Goldfarb might also 
have admitted Mr. Klinger’s breach of duty and that his breach of duty caused harm. 
Denying the extent of the injuries perhaps made sense, as the insurance company that 
paid Senter Goldfarb to defend the case might be on the hook for those damages. 
However, admitting the codefendant’s duty, breach, and causation of damages could 
have helped the insurance company that paid Senter Goldfarb to represent its insured. 
Pointing the plaintiff toward the codefendant Department of Corrections would have 
pointed the plaintiff away from Senter Goldfarb’s client. 
After claiming no requirement that they answer an allegation directed at a 
codefendant, the insurance defense mill lawyers of Senter Goldfarb heaped more 
nonsense into their answer. The lawyers added this sentence: “To the extent that a 
response is required, Defendants are without sufficient information and knowledge to 
form a belief as to the truth and veracity of the allegations contained in paragraphs 16, 
17, and 18 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.”248 There are at least three problems with this 
sentence. First, Rule 8 requires a response. Second, if the defendants truly were 
without “sufficient information and knowledge,” then Colorado Rule 8(b) makes clear 
that the lawyer need only say so. Honestly, why answer with “we do not have to 
answer, but if we did we know nothing?”249 Third, one doubts that the insurance 
defense mill lawyers had so little information.250 The crash happened in December 
2012.251 The plaintiff’s lawyers filed the complaint on May 6, 2015, and the insurance 
defense mill lawyers filed their answer more than two months later on July 14, 
2015.252 As I will discuss below, insurance claim agents investigate crashes and 
compile claim investigation files.253 The insurance defense mill lawyers answered 
more than two and a half years after the accident. If we are to believe the defense 
firm’s answer, the insurance company’s claim representatives found no facts—no 
“sufficient information and knowledge”—that would allow the Senter Goldfarb 
attorneys to admit the “truth and veracity” of a single fact among those the plaintiff’s 
lawyers alleged regarding the Department of Corrections and its officer. 
 
247 Id. at 3, para. 18. 
248 Jacobs Answer, supra note 242, at 2, para. 6. 
249 Hogan’s Heroes (CBS Prods. 1965–1971) (“I know nothing!” (John Banner as Sergeant 
Hans Schultz)).  
250 Fourth, “truth and veracity” is redundant. COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b) refers to “the truth of an 
averment” not “truth and veracity.” See id. (“If he is without knowledge or information 
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and this has the effect 
of a denial.”). 
251 Jacobs Answer, supra note 242, at 1, para. 1. 
252 Id. at 4; Jacobs Complaint, supra note 237, at 1. 
253 See infra Section III.D. 
37Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021
822 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [69:785 
Additional examples of insurance defense mill lawyers refusing to answer 
allegations about codefendants abound. A four-car collision from June 2014 provides 
more.254 The plaintiff, Aracely Wineman-Warehime was driving in afternoon traffic 
on West Sixth Avenue in Denver.255 She stopped. The defendant Suan Bonine rear-
ended Ms. Wineman-Warehime and pushed her car into the car in front.256 Then, 
predictably, Vernon Anderson rear-ended Ms. Bonine, which pushed Ms. Bonine’s 
car again into the plaintiff’s car, which then crashed again into the car ahead: a four-
car collision with two vehicles rear-ending the cars just in front.257 This is not rocket 
science; it’s bumper cars. 
Two lawyers from Franklin D. Azar and Associates, P.C., filed the lawsuit on 
behalf of Ms. Wineman-Warehime.258 Frank Azar, Esq., is among the television 
advertisers whom Professor Engstrom characterizes as a “settlement mill lawyer,” 
although this case makes clear his firm files lawsuits and does not rely on settlements 
alone.259 The Azar and Associates  lawyers presented negligence and negligence per 
se claims against the two defendants.260 For Ms. Bonine, the driver who rear-ended 
the plaintiff Ms. Wineman-Warehime, Janet Spies, Esq., answered.261 Ms. Spies’s 
firm, Spies, Powers & Robinson, P.C., filed 1.6% of the answers in the sample.262 
Helpfully, Ms. Spies admits in the answer that her client rear-ended the plaintiff—
“admits that the front of the vehicle she was driving collided with the rear of the 
vehicle being driven by the Plaintiff”—and also that Mr. Anderson “struck from 
 
254 Complaint at 2, para. 7, Wineman-Warehime v. Bonine, No. 2015CV32084 (Colo. Dist. 
Ct. June 11, 2015) (Denver Cnty.) [hereinafter Wineman-Warehime Complaint]. 
255 Id.  
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. at 1. 
259 See Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1497 n.47 (“Frank Azar & 
Associates fulfilled most settlement mill factors. First, the firm operated in extremely high 
volumes, handling about 3,000 claims a year . . . . Second, the firm engaged in aggressive ‘in 
your face’ television advertising . . . . Like other settlement mills, the firm only ‘[v]ery, very 
rarely’ got referrals from other law firms or lawyers . . . . Third, in typical cases, Azar had a 
routinized claim settlement process characterized by a number of discrete steps or ‘phases.’” 
(internal citation omitted)); id. at 1496–97 (“At Frank Azar & Associates, described in the press 
as ‘Denver’s best-known personal injury law practice,’ it appears that trials were conducted to 
resolve only about 0.3% of claims.”); id. at 1527 (“At Azar & Associates, cases ‘often’ settled 
for as little as $2,000.”). 
260 Wineman-Warehime Complaint, supra note 254, at 2, para. 7. 
261 Defendant Suan Bonine’s Answer and Jury Demand at 1, Wineman-Warehime v. Bonine, 
No. 2015CV32084 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 6, 2015) (Denver Cnty.), Filing ID No. 
7D45C5F6277C0 [hereinafter Bonnie Answer to Wineman-Warehime Complaint]. 
262 See supra text accompanying notes 136–137.  
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behind” Ms. Bonine’s vehicle, which then hit the plaintiff’s car again.263 However, 
Ms. Spies eschews the opportunity to pile on Mr. Anderson and instead answers 
allegations directed at him by stating seven different times that the allegations “are not 
directed against this Defendant and therefore require no response.”264 Again, Rule 8(b) 
disallows this response, and although admission of claims of negligence against a 
codefendant might be of little marginal value, such admissions would be at least 
slightly more valuable than no answer at all; plus, of course, actually answering would 
comport with the Rules.  
Mr. Anderson’s lawyer, Matthew Baukol, Esq., filed an even less helpful 
answer.265 Mr. Baukol admitted only that his client was an individual who resided in 
Colorado, that the incident took place in Denver, and that Denver County District 
Court had jurisdiction and was the right venue.266 Mr. Baukol denied everything else 
in the complaint or claimed to lack sufficient information and therefore denied the 
allegations.267 As with Ms. Spies, his solidarity with codefendants overcame any 
strategic advantage he might have gained by aligning against the codefendant; he 
denied all the allegations against his client’s codefendant, Ms. Bonine.268 Where Ms. 
Spies had agreed that both defendants rear-ended the cars in front of them, Mr. Baukol 
found nothing to agree with in the narrative that the Azar lawyers included in the 
complaint:269 
On or about June 25, 2014 at approximately 3:49 p.m., Plaintiff was traveling 
eastbound on West 6th Avenue and came to a stop in traffic. Defendant 
Bonine was traveling eastbound on West 6th Avenue as well, behind Plaintiff. 
Defendant Bonine struck the rear of Plaintiff’s vehicle, pushing Plaintiff’s 
vehicle into the vehicle in front of her. After this collision occurred, 
Defendant Bonine was struck by a fourth vehicle driven by Defendant 
Vernon Anderson, which pushed Defendant Bonine into Plaintiff’s vehicle a 
 
263 Bonnie Answer to Wineman-Warehime Complaint, supra note 261, at 2, para. 10. 
264 Id. at 2–3, paras. 11–12, 20–24. 
265 Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 1, Wineman-Warehime, No. 2015CV32084, 
Filing ID No. 1066A9A627EA6 [hereinafter Anderson Answer to Wineman-Warehime 
Complaint]. 
266 Id. at 1, para. 1. 
267 Id. at 1, paras. 2–3, 5, 7, 10. Denying an allegation for which a defense lawyer has 
insufficient information to admit or deny makes no sense as a matter of logic. As Judge Shadur 
asked: “how can a party disclaim knowledge or information even to form a belief as to the truth 
of an allegation and then go on to deny it?” Webb v. Medicredit, Inc., No. 16-C-11125, 2017 
WL 74854, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2017). See Russell, supra note 141, at 940, 947, 949; id. at 
144 (“Judge Shadur’s colleagues in the Northern District of Illinois also cited the appendix when 
confronting defendants’ formulaic claims regarding their lack of knowledge of information.”). 
268 Anderson Answer to Wineman-Warehime Complaint, supra note 265, at 1, para. 3. 
269 Id. at 1, para. 2. 
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second time. This second impact pushed Plaintiff’s vehicle into the vehicle 
in front of her a second time as well.270 
Rule 8(b) states that “[w]hen a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or 
a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material 
and shall deny only the remainder.”271 Ms. Spies parsed this paragraph, agreed that 
her client had rear-ended the plaintiff, agreed that Mr. Baukol’s client had rear-ended 
her own client, and agreed that there were secondary collisions.272 By contrast, Mr. 
Baukol denied the entire paragraph; not even the date, time, or location were “true and 
material.”273  
Azar and Associates received a similar insurance defense mill runaround in a suit 
the firm filed in June 2015 on behalf of Jose Reyes.274 The Azar firm’s clever first 
allegation in the amended complaint’s first claim for relief lays out the needed facts to 
understand this story of negligence:  
On or about September 16, 2013 at approximately 10:35 a.m., Plaintiff Jose 
Reyes was injured when Defendant Tony Zulu's motor vehicle, a 2005 Ford 
Crown Victoria, (taxi cab) when Defendant [sic] drove into the living room 
of the Plaintiff. The accident took place at the private property at 245 N. Sable 
Blvd., Unit 9105, Aurora, Colorado in Arapahoe County, Colorado.275 
On behalf of Reyes, Azar and Associates filed suit against the taxi driver, Tony 
Zulu; the company for which Mr. Zulu drove, Metro Taxi; and also against Mr. Zulu’s 
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage carrier alleging that the carrier had failed 
to pay benefits to which Mr. Zulu was entitled.276 
Torts professors and civil procedure professors might expect the codefendants to 
deny their own liability but point the finger of blame at each other in order to reduce 
their own liability; that’s not at all what happened. White and Steele, P.C., which filed 
3.0% of the answers in the sample,277 represented the uninsured/underinsured motorist 
carrier Ameriprise Auto & Home Insurance.278 For the insurer, White and Steele 
admitted only four of the twenty-four paragraphs in the Azar firm’s complaint—the 
 
270 Wineman-Warehime Complaint, supra note 254, at 2, para. 7. 
271 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b). 
272 Bonnie Answer to Wineman-Warehime Complaint, supra note 261, at 1–2, para. 7.  
273 Anderson Answer to Wineman-Warehime Complaint, supra note 265, at 1, para. 2. 
274 Amended Complaint at 1, Reyes v. Zulu, No. 2015CV31509 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 13, 2016) 
(Arapahoe Cnty.) [hereinafter Reyes Amended Complaint]. 
275 Id. at 2, para 6. 
276 Id. at 4, para. 24; see infra p. 71 (explaining UM/UIM cases). 
277 See supra text accompanying notes 136137.  
278 Defendant, IDS Property Casualty Insurance Company d/b/a Ameriprise Auto & Home 
Insurance, Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 1, Reyes, No. 2015CV31509, Filing ID 
No. C04CC0C3B0939 [hereinafter Ameriprise Auto & Home Ins. Answer, Reyes]. 
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insurance firm’s name and address, that venue in Arapahoe County was proper, that 
Reyes had an Ameriprise policy with coverage of $100,000 per person and $300,000 
per accident, and that Mr. Reyes was an “insured person” under the policy entitled to 
uninsured motorist benefits.279 One way or another, White and Steele denied or refused 
to answer all the other Azar allegations. Twelve different times, White and Steele’s 
answer intones: 
With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph [__] of the Complaint, 
these allegations are not directed to this defendant. As such, no responsive 
pleading is required by this defendant. To the extent that any allegations 
contained therein may be construed to be asserted against this defendant, the 
allegation shall be taken as denied or avoided.280 
Leaving aside what the passive formulation “taken as denied or avoided” even 
means, White and Steele deployed the “not directed to this defendant” gambit to avoid 
commenting on the factual allegations that describe Mr. Zulu crashing his Crown Vic 
taxi into Mr. Reyes’s living room.281 The insurance defense mill lawyers avoided 
admitting or denying the date, time, place, driver’s name, type of car, fact that the car 
was a cab, name of the cab company, property address, and whether the car crashed 
into the living room.282 Likewise, though, the insurance defense mill lawyers at White 
and Steele also claimed their insurance company client was “without sufficient 
information” to admit that Reyes was “an individual and resident of the State of 
Colorado,” even though he was their insured!283 
Azar and Associates fared little better in inducing the other codefendants to blame 
someone else. Just as the insurance defense mill lawyers representing the insurance 
company might have wanted to blame the comparatively deep-pocketed cab company 
or the perhaps judgement-proof cab driver, so too did the defense lawyers representing 
the driver have every incentive to blame their codefendants. Instead, Mr. Zulu’s 
lawyer, Nick Herrick, Esq., of the firm of Wood, Smith, Henning & Berman, LLP, 
eleven times chanted that “[a]nswering Paragraph[s 14–24], Plaintiff’s [Third or 
Fourth] Claim for Relief is not alleged against Tony Zulu and, therefore, does not 
require a response.”284 For good measure, Mr. Herrick also claimed that five 
 
279 Id. at 2–3, paras 4–5, 19–20. 
280 Id. at 2–3, paras. 6–17. 
281 Id. The Azar firm is a dominant television advertiser in the Denver metro area, with Azar 
(who is a graduate of the law school where the author teaches) calling himself “The Strong 
Arm.” As is typical of urban American television markets, Azar advertises heavily on daytime 
television. Frank Azar, I Am Frank Azar, YOUTUBE (Sept. 18, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NN7lmqTLT8s. Perhaps, when Zulu crashed into Reyes’s 
living room at 10:35 a.m., one of Azar’s ads was running on the television. 
282 Ameriprise Auto & Home Ins. Answer, Reyes, supra note 278, at 2, para. 6. 
283 Id. para. 1, at 1; Reyes Amended Complaint, supra note 274, at 1, para. 1. 
284 Defendant Tony Zulu’s Answer to Amended Complaint at 2–3, paras. 14–17, 19–24, Reyes 
v. Zulu, No. 2015CV31509 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 1, 2016) (Arapahoe Cnty.), Filing ID No. 
BB3C37E263A9E [hereinafter Zulu Answer to Reyes Complaint]. 
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allegations “call for a legal conclusion and therefore do not merit or require a 
response.”285  
 For fifteen of the complaint’s twenty-four paragraphs, Mr. Herrick ignored the 
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and refused to answer.286 All that he admitted was 
that Mr. Zulu was “an individual and resident of the State of Colorado,” that venue in 
Arapahoe County was proper, and that Mr. Zulu was driving a 2005 Ford Crown 
Victoria and was involved in an accident at 245 North Sable Blvd.287 Mr. Herrick 
simply ignored the date and time of the accident, the fact that the Crown Vic was a 
taxi, and the room in which the crash occurred.  
The cab driver’s insurance defense mill lawyer refused to admit very basic facts 
that his client surely knew and that would have helped his client. Such refusal violates 
the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and likely also the Colorado Rules of 
Professional Conduct in my opinion. For example, the Azar firm lawyers pleaded that 
codefendant “MKBS LLC has Metro Taxi as a trade name.”288 Denver cab drivers at 
the time signed leases as independent contractors with area cab companies, and Mr. 
Zulu would have of course been familiar with MKBS, LLC, as the entity that operated 
Metro Taxi.289 Even so, Mr. Zulu’s lawyers claimed insufficient information and so 
denied the allegation that MKBS, LLC, operated Metro Taxi.290 Similarly, Mr. Zulu’s 
lawyers denied that their client was “the employee or agent of Defendant MKBS, LLC, 
and was acting within the scope of his employment and authority . . . .”291 A truthful 
answer consistent with Rule 8 might have denied that the cab driver was an employee 
but admitted that as an independent contractor he acted within the scope of his 
authority vis à vis Metro Taxi. Such an admission would likely have benefitted Mr. 
Zulu by bringing him within the scope of Metro Taxi’s insurance coverage. Almost 
certainly, Mr. Zulu’s Crown Vic was painted in Metro Taxi colors, with the company 
name and phone number on the vehicle. Playing cat-and-mouse with that admission 
was untruthful and did not help Mr. Zulu. 
Lastly, Azar and Associates fared no better with the answer of the third 
codefendant, MKBS, LLC, which operated Metro Taxi. Harris, Karstaedt, Jamison & 
 
285 Id. at 2, paras. 7–8, 10–12. 
286 Id. at 2–3, paras. 7–8, 10–12, 14–17, 19–24. 
287 Id. at 1–2, paras. 2, 5–6; Reyes Amended Complaint, supra note 274, at 1–2, paras. 2, 5–6. 
288 Reyes Amended Complaint, supra note 274, at 1, para 3. 
289 In re Application of MKBS, LLC, 11L-374CP, 2011 WL 5100577, at *1 (Colo. Pub. Utils. 
Comm’n Apr. 27, 2011) (commission order granting tariff changes) (“Metro Taxi states: [its] 
drivers are independent contractors . . . .” (alteration in original)). 
290  Zulu Answer to Reyes Complaint, supra note 284, at 2, para. 3; Reyes Amended Complaint, 
supra note 274, at 1, para. 3. 
291 Zulu Answer to Reyes Complaint, supra note 284, at 2, para. 14; Reyes Amended 
Complaint, supra note 274, at 2, para. 14. 
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Powers, P.C., admitted two allegations.292 First, the firm admitted that MKBS, LLC, 
was “a limited liability company in good standing, authorized to do business in the 
State of Colorado and operate[d] in Aurora, Colorado.”293 Second, the firm admitted 
the venue was proper in Arapahoe County.294 The insurance defense mill lawyers 
pleaded nine times that “paragraph [__] does not contain allegations against this 
Defendant and, therefore no response is required. If any portion of paragraph [__] is 
intended or considered to contain an allegation against this Defendant[,] it is 
denied.”295 The firm also denied seven paragraphs and claimed there was insufficient 
knowledge to answer several others.296 Regarding paragraph six, which alleged that 
one morning in September 2013, a Metro Taxi Crown Vic crashed into the plaintiff’s 
living room, Metro Taxi’s lawyers denied the entire paragraph.297 Rule 8(b) expects 
that “[w]hen a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an 
averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the 
remainder.”298 Harris, Karstaedt specified nothing as true and answered Reyes’s 
complaint with a response that effectively meant “none of this happened.”299 
Mr. Reyes, who apparently injured his hip rushing from the bathroom after the 
crash, sued three codefendants.300 Together, these three codefendants claimed thirty-
one different times that they could refuse to answer allegations directed at another 
codefendant. The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure require an admission or a denial. 
The codefendants’ evasion advanced nothing at all. Perhaps this sort of nonsense is 
fun to file, but is this variant of the practice of law what we call professional? 
The final illustration of insurance defense mill lawyers’ use of the “not my client, 
so I don’t have to answer” response returns to Ms. Jahn. As noted above, Ms. Jahn 
deployed the “calls for a legal conclusion” response to nearly half of a complaint filed 
in a rear-end collision case.301 The American Family Insurance in-house lawyer also 
used the “not my defendant” claim when answering. Ms. Jahn represented both 
 
292 Defendant MKBS, LLC’s Answer to Amended Complaint at 1, para. 2, Reyes v. Zulu, No. 
2015CV31509 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 30, 2016) (Arapahoe Cnty.), Filing ID No. 
66839F3D54C78 [hereinafter MKBS Answer to Reyes Complaint]. 
293 Id.; Reyes Amended Complaint, supra note 274, at 1 para. 3. 
294 Reyes Amended Complaint, supra note 274, at 1, para. 5; MKBS Answer to Reyes 
Complaint, supra note 292, at 1, para. 2. 
295 MKBS Answer to Reyes Complaint, supra note 292, at 1–2, paras. 4, 6, 11. 
296 Id. at 1–2, paras. 1, 3, 7, 9.  
297 Id. at 1, para. 3; Reyes Amended Complaint, supra note 274, at 2, para. 6. 
298 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b). 
299 MKBS Answer to Reyes Complaint, supra note 292, at 1, para. 3. 
300 Reyes Amended Complaint, supra note 274, at 1. 
301 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4. 
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codefendants in a case—the driver of the truck and his employer.302 In Colorado, with 
sufficient advisement and disclosure, a single attorney may represent codefendants 
between whom there may be a conflict of interest.303 Evan Banker, Esq., includes as 
paragraph three of his complaint that “[u]pon information and belief, Defendant Jesus 
Malvaes-Ortiz is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Arapahoe County, 
Colorado.”304 Ms. Jahn, in answering for Mr. Malvaes-Ortiz, admitted the 
allegation.305 However, in answering for Mr. Malvaes-Ortiz’s employer, she stated 
that “Defendant does not respond to the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of 
Plaintiff’s Complaint as they appear to be directed at another party.”306 That is, she 
admitted the allegation in one answer but refused to answer the same allegation in the 
other. In fairness, she filed the company’s answer before she filed the driver’s answer, 
and perhaps she only learned that the driver was a U.S. citizen and an Arapahoe 
County resident after she answered on behalf of his employer. But wouldn’t his 
employer have been able to admit that information? Indeed, although the allegation is 
about the driver, the plaintiff’s lawyer did not specifically direct it at either defendant. 
He did not, for example, include it within a claim for relief directed at one or the other 
defendant. Evading the response by claiming not to have to answer makes the 
employer appear to be hiding something. The insurance defense mill lawyer’s 
reflexive, determined insistence on not answering thus does just a bit of harm to one 
of her clients. Plus, being able to answer an allegation for one client but not being 
willing to answer for another is weird. 
Nothing about Colorado’s Rule 8 allows a defense attorney to avoid answering 
when the plaintiff’s lawyer has directed an allegation at a codefendant, a non-party at 
fault, or another person. Federal Rule 8 directs that the “party must . . . admit or deny 
the allegations asserted against it by an opposing party”307 Perhaps the phrase 
“asserted against it” allows codefendants in federal lawsuits to not answer claims 
against codefendants.308 However, Colorado’s Rule 8 does not limit the allegations to 
which a defendant must respond to only those “asserted against it.”309 The plain text 
 
302 Id. at 1; Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 1, Anthony v. Transport Oh, No. 
2015CV30639M (Colo. Dist. Ct. Aug. 5, 2015) (Boulder Cnty.), Filing ID No. 
9AE3D70546562 [hereinafter Transportation Oh Answer to Anthony Complaint]. 
303 COLO. R. PRO. CONDUCT 1.7(b). 
304 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 1, para. 3. 
305 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 1. 
306 Transportation Oh Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 302, at 1, para. 3. 
307 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).  
308 Judge Shadur did not allow lawyers to refuse to answer allegations against codefendants. 
Faced with lawyers who answered on behalf of three codefendants but who cagily refused to 
admit what any single defendant knew about the others, Judge Shadur ordered the lawyers to 
file a consolidated reply shorn of evasions. Azza Int’l Corp. v. Gas Rsch. Inst., 204 F.R.D. 109, 
110 (N.D. Ill. 2001). Russell, supra note 141, at 938.  
309 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b). 
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of Colorado’s Rules of Civil Procedure directs the defendant to “admit or deny the 
averments of the adverse party.”310  
As with refusals to answer when the defending attorney spots a call for a legal 
conclusion, the proper path for Colorado defense counsel facing an allegation directed 
at a codefendant is to admit or deny. For plaintiffs’ attorneys, the evasion is 
maddening. Justice does not advance. Furthermore, defendants, that is, the insureds, 
should also want answers to develop information concerning the culpability of 
codefendants who ought to share in the liability. Insurance defense mill lawyers would 
better serve both the liability insurers and their own clients if they admit information 
that points to another party for whom a different insurance carrier will have to pay. 
C. Document Speaks for Itself 
As with legal conclusions and allegations concerning codefendants, insurance 
defense lawyers also evade Rule 8’s clear path when plaintiffs’ attorneys refer in 
complaints to documents or statutes. Insurance defense settlement lawyers typically 
claim that the “document speaks for itself.”311  
Documents never spoke to Judge Shadur during his lifetime. He explained that 
“[a]nother unacceptable device, used by lawyers who would prefer not to admit 
something that is alleged about a document in a complaint (or who may perhaps be 
too lazy to craft an appropriate response to such an allegation), is to say instead that 
the document ‘speaks for itself.’”312 Reviewing his years on the bench, Judge Shadur 
revealed that “[t]his Court has been attempting to listen to such written materials for 
years (in the forlorn hope that one will indeed give voice)—but until some such writing 
does break its silence,” he continued, “this Court will continue to require pleaders to 
employ one of the three alternatives that are permitted by Rule 8(b) in response to all 
allegations about the contents of documents (or statutes or regulations).”313 
Colorado insurance defense mill lawyers claim that rules, statutes, and documents 
speak. For example, one firm’s attorney responds to allegations concerning venue by 
reciting that “[t]o the extent a response is required, Defendant states that C.R.C.P. 
98(c) speaks for itself.”314 In none of the answers from this firm—a bit-player that 
answered just 1.4% of the cases in the sample—did the firm’s lawyer actually admit 
that the district court in which the plaintiff had filed was the proper venue.315 The 
 
310 Id. 
311 Russell, supra note 141, at Sections VII.A., VIII.A., IX.A. 
312 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 279 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
313 Id. 
314 Answer, Defenses and Jury Demand at 1, para. 3, Vivar v. Cedillo-Macias, No. 
2015CV30042 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 27, 2015) (Denver Cnty.) [hereinafter Vivar Answer]. 
315 Id.; Answer, Defenses and Jury Demand to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 1, para. 2, 
Roybal v. Barbosa, No. 2015CV30311 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Sept. 8, 2015) (Weld Cnty.); Answer, 
Defenses and Jury Demand at 1, para. 3, Byrne v. Hogue, No. 2015CV30028 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 
July 8, 2015) (Lake Cnty.); Defendant Jeffery Jefferson’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Amended 
Complaint at 1, para. 2, Vallejos v. Gallegos, No. 2015CV30020 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 29, 2016) 
(Huerfano Cnty.), Filing ID No. 5CAAB010EBE4E; Answer, Defenses and Jury Demand at 1, 
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defense lawyer’s repeated practice is to respond to allegations concerning venue by 
first refusing to answer conclusions of law and then by stating the rule speaks for itself: 
The allegations set forth in the second paragraph 3 and paragraph 4 of 
Plaintiff’s Complaint concern venue, which are conclusions of law to which 
this Defendant can neither admit nor deny. To the extent a response is 
required, Defendant states that C.R.C.P. 98 speaks for itself.316 
The lawyer claims, contra Colorado Rule 8(b), that his client “can neither admit 
nor deny” a conclusion of law and then wraps that misstatement in a contingent claim 
that Rule 98 speaks though the defendant cannot. This lawyer does not merely say that 
the legal conclusions require no response but that his client, the defendant, cannot 
admit or deny them.  
Insurance defense mill lawyers also give voice to statutes in the same way. The 
same lawyer whose clients cannot admit or deny a legal conclusion notes in response 
to the defendant’s allegation of parts of title 42 of the Colorado Motor Vehicle Code, 
that “C.R.S. 42-4-1401, 42-4-1402, and 42-4-1101 speak for themselves.”317 Bruce 
Shibles, Esq., an in-house attorney for Farmers Insurance, simply notes that the 
defendant “also states that any statute cited in Plaintiff’s Complaint speaks for 
itself.”318 This broad brush tactic, which contravenes the Colorado Rules of Civil 
Procedure, is characteristic of insurance defense mill lawyers. Rather than the lawyer 
or paralegal responding to each of the eight allegations that include a reference to the 
Colorado Motor Vehicle Code,319 the answer brushes all these allegations away at 
once, in addition to the reference to Rule 98320 and the state constitution.321 
Other lawyers hedge a bit on just what the statutes have to say for themselves. 
Take for example, Allstate employee Christopher R. Jones, Esq., who answers on 
behalf of the in-house firm Temple & Associates. When faced with a statute, Mr. Jones 
first cites the statute, which he then notes “speaks for itself.”322 Next, Mr. Jones hedges 
 
para. 3, Smith v. Holmes, No. 2015CV30780 (Colo. Dist. Ct. May 6, 2015) (El Paso Cnty.) 
[hereinafter Smith Answer]. 
316 Smith Answer, supra note 315, at 1, para. 3. 
317 Vivar Answer, supra note 314, at 2, para. 7. 
318 Ewing’s Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 2, Jensen v. Ewing, No. 2015CV30096 
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Feb. 24, 2015) (Douglas Cnty.). 
319 Complaint paras. at 3–4, 22–29, Jensen, No. 2015CV30096. 
320 Id. at 2, para 4. 
321 Id. at 1, para. 3. 
322 Defendant Kevin A. Cox’s Answer and Jury Demand at 2, paras. 16–17, Clark v. Cox, No. 
2015CV30048 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mar. 27, 2015) (Douglas Cnty.) [hereinafter Clark Answer]; 
Defendant Alexander Yeros’s Answer and Jury Demand at 2, para. 17, Moore v. Yeros, No. 
2015CV30251 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 1, 2015) (Douglas Cnty.) [hereinafter Moore Answer]; 
Answer of Defendants Noah T. Depsky and Meghan Beaudion, Incorrectly Identified as Megan 
Donohue in the Complaint, and Jury Demand at 2–3, paras. 14–16, Mainridge-King v. Depsky, 
No. 2015CV30265 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 1, 2015) (Douglas Cnty.) [hereinafter Mainridge-King 
Answer]; Defendant Gloria Basquez’s Answer and Jury Demand at 2, para. 16, Martinez v. 
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his bet just a bit by adding that he “[d]enied to the extent the allegations are contrary 
to, inconsistent with, or misstate” Colorado law.323 Together, he asserts that a statute 
speaks for itself—means what it means—but then says that to the extent—an extent 
that he leaves unexamined—that the plaintiff’s allegations misstate the law, he denies 
them. That is, if the plaintiff means to say what the statute does not say when speaking 
for itself, then Mr. Jones, attorney for the defendant, denies. Rule 8(b) does not 
authorize this evasion. 
Other insurance defense mill lawyers hedge the manner in which they avoid 
answering differently by giving voice to statutes. The Harris, Karstaedt firm, for 
example, deployed this language: “Defendant maintains that each cited statutory 
authority or municipal ordinance speaks for itself or is subject to interpretation by the 
court; therefore,” the firm’s attorneys claim, “these assertions of paragraph [__] are 
not allegations to which a response is owed.”324 Put differently, the statute means what 
it means, unless the judge says it means something else, but either way, defense 
counsel will admit nothing about the statute. 
Not only statutes, but also documents, speak for themselves, thereby inspiring 
insurance defense mill lawyers to evade answering as Colorado Rule 8(b) requires. In 
answering Elizabeth Nelson’s suit against Dillon Companies, the parent company of 
the grocery chain King Soopers, Dina Bernardelli, Esq., claimed, in response to an 
allegation, that “[t]he State of Colorado Traffic Accident Report speaks for itself and 
does not require a response.”325 In the original complaint, Richard Kaudy, Esq., had 
alleged that “as reflected by a State of Colorado Traffic Accident Report, Rhoades 
failed to yield to the Elizabeth Nelson vehicle while making a left turn at the 
intersection of Wadsworth Boulevard and Mississippi Avenue in the City of 
Lakewood.”326 In a beautiful amended complaint, Mr. Kaudy added a scan of the 
Traffic Accident Report, photos of the vehicles involved including damage to the 
plaintiff’s car, copies of the King Soopers incident report, and other graphics 
documenting his client’s claim.327 The insurance defense mill lawyer’s answer—that 
the Traffic Accident Report speaks for itself—seems risky in light of Mr. Kaudy’s 
factual allegations and other support. However, Ms. Bernardelli added that “[t]o the 
 
Basquez, No. 2015CV30152 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 3, 2015) (Pueblo Cnty.) [hereinafter Martinez 
Answer]. 
323  Clark Answer, supra note 322, at 2, paras. 16–17; Moore Answer, supra note 322, at 2, 
para. 17; Mainridge-King Answer, supra note 322, at 2–3, paras. 14–16; Martinez Answer, 
supra note 322, at 2, para. 16. 
324 Answer of Earnest T. Prince to Complaint and Jury Demand at 3, para. 13, Wiley v. Steven-
Roberts Originals, LLC., No. 2015CV31815 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 10, 2015) (Denver Cnty.), 
Filing ID No. 1020648B53936. 
325 Answer and Jury Demand, at 2, para. 16, Nelson v. Dillon Cos., Inc., No. 2015CV30870 
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Aug. 10, 2015) (Jefferson Cnty.) [hereinafter Nelson Answer]; see supra notes 
93–112 and accompanying text (providing information on how traffic accident reports are 
compiled).  
326 Complaint and Jury Demand at 2, para. 15, Nelson, No. 2015CV30870. 
327 Plaintiff Elizabeth Nelson Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 2, 4–12, Nelson, No. 
2015CV30870. 
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extent a response is required, all allegations in Paragraph 15 are denied.”328 The 
insurance defense mill lawyer’s message? The Traffic Accident Report speaks and 
means what it means, but when the plaintiff’s lawyer repeats what the report says, the 
defense denies everything.329  
Ms. Bernardelli’s claim that the Traffic Accident Report speaks for itself is also 
problematic considering the issue with KABCO data that I described above.330 A party 
to a crash may tell the police officer that she is injured. If the injury the party claims 
is not evident to the officer, the officer may record a 1 (though not a 0) in the Traffic 
Accident Report. Later the Colorado Department of Transportation’s chief engineer 
interprets that 1 as an injury, but the state epidemiologist who writes a report using 
that data declares there was no injury. How has the Traffic Accident Report spoken 
for itself? 
When the police ticket a defendant after a crash, the plaintiff’s lawyers sometimes 
make reference to that ticket in the complaint. Referring to the ticket leads to several 
problems. In her answer for Clyde Coffman and Rocky Top Resources, Inc., Jane 
Bendle Lucero, Esq., had to contend with the plaintiff’s allegation that the Colorado 
State Patrol had given a ticket to Mr. Coffman after he rear-ended Aaron and Darin 
Wedemeyer.331 Ms. Lucero admitted that the Colorado State Patrol came to the scene 
of the “subject accident.”332 She then correctly noted that “[t]he remainder of the 
allegations contained in paragraph 13 of Plaintiff’s Complaint reference inadmissible 
information and/or documentation.”333 Ms. Lucero then wrote that “Defendant states 
that the referenced citation, inadmissible in this lawsuit, speaks for itself.”334 What a 
tangle of language! 
A simpler approach to the allegation of a traffic ticket exists. Benjamin Wegener, 
Esq., then an associate at Younge & Hockensmith, P.C., in Grand Junction, Colorado, 
and now the first named partner at Wegener Scarborough Younge & Hockensmith 
LLP, responded differently to the plaintiff’s allegation of a ticket. Mr. Wegener simply 
stated that “[w]ith regard to the allegations contained in Paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs’ 
Complaint, Defendants admit only that Jackson was issued a citation for following too 
closely, but deny that the same is relevant or admissible.”335 Ms. Lucero might have 
tried this approach rather than awkwardly claiming that the ticket spoke for itself.  
 
328 Nelson Answer, supra note 325, at 2, para. 16. 
329 Id. 
330 See supra text accompanying notes 96–104 (describing KABCO reporting methodology). 
331 Complaint at 2, paras. 6, 13, Wedemeyer v. Coffman, No. 2015CV31363 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 
May 12, 2015) (El Paso Cnty.). 
332 Wedemeyer Answer, supra note 225, at 2, para. 13. 
333 Id. 
334 Id. 
335 Defendants’ Answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Jury Demand at 2, para. 13, McCormick 
v. Jackson, No. 2015CV30055 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 27, 2015) (La Plata Cnty.). 
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Both Ms. Lucero and Mr. Wegener are right that Colorado makes inadmissible a 
traffic ticket that a party receives.336 Allstate’s attorney, Christopher Jones, Esq., 
simply includes a notation that “[r]eference to the citation received by Defendant is 
inadmissible and should be stricken. See C.R.S. § 42-4-1713.”337 Too often, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys seem not to know that records of traffic-ticket convictions are inadmissible, 
just as too often they cite violations of statutes that will not support negligence per se 
or the breach of a statutory duty. Properly speaking, Rule 8(b) requires that the defense 
attorney admit the ticket, as Mr. Wegener did. After that, noting the ticket’s 
inadmissibility, rather than fussing with a Rule 12(f) motion to strike impertinent 
material,338 is a perfectly acceptable approach to extinguishing the plaintiff’s 
attorney’s improper tactic. Ms. Lucero’s alternative approach of simultaneously 
claiming that the document speaks for itself but should not be admitted as evidence 
weirdly both gives voice to and muzzles the ticket. As an insurance defense mill 
attorney, Ms. Lucero reflexively claims that every document speaks for itself and 
secondarily must clean up any document that speaks out of turn. 
Most laughable are claims by two different insurance defense mill lawyers that 
insurance policies spoke for themselves. In a suit against two insurers, Shelter 
Insurance’s attorney answered three allegations this way: “Shelter asserts that the 
applicable Shelter auto policy speaks for itself . . . .”339 Anyone who has ever read or 
tried to read an insurance policy knows that no policy speaks for itself, and policies 
do not even mean what they seem to mean. Furthermore, if policies spoke for 
themselves, the need for lawyers and judges would be substantially less. Shelter’s 
attorney, Sophia Tsai, Esq., tacked on another sentence after claiming the policy spoke 
for itself: “Shelter denies any allegations of said paragraph that are inconsistent with 
the terms of the policy.”340 Ms. Tsai gets the Rule 8(b) process of answering 
complaints exactly backwards. She claims that the allegations may be factually 
incorrect, and if so, the self-speaking insurance policy overrules the allegation. 
However, her answers to these allegations do nothing at all to advance the truth-
seeking function and instead claim some other truth may exist within the policy.341 
 
336 COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1713 (2020) (“[N]o record of the conviction of any person for any 
violation of this article shall be admissible as evidence in any court in any civil action.”). 
337 Clark Answer, supra note 322, at 1, para. 4. 
338 COLO. R. CIV. P. 12(f) (“[T]he court may order any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 
scandalous matter stricken from any pleading, motion, or other paper.”). 
339 Answer and Jury Demand at 2–3, paras. 11–13, Snyder v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., No. 
2015CV30096 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 23, 2015) (Broomfield Cnty.), Filing ID No. 
34BF0AAA9D2BF. 
340 Id.  
341 Id. (“Shelter asserts that the applicable Shelter auto policy speaks for itself, and Shelter 
denies any allegations of said paragraph that are inconsistent with the terms of the policy.”); see 
also id. at 4, para. 11 (explaining that the Plaintiff is not the real party of interest); USAA’s 
Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint and Jury Demand, Austin v. USAA Cas. Ins., No. 
2015CV30489 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Nov. 16, 2015) (Larimer Cnty.) [hereinafter Austin Answer] 
(“USAA states that the policy speaks for itself.”). 
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Forty-seven of the 356 answers included the nonanswer that a document spoke for 
itself.342 This is 12.8% of the answers. Here again, I did not tally how many of the 
complaints included allegations that referred to documents or statutes and thereby 
created the opportunity for evasion using the claim that the document spoke for itself. 
As Judge Shadur experienced during his own career on the federal bench in Illinois, 
statutes and documents do not speak—especially not insurance policies. Insurance 
defense mill attorneys should instead admit the existence of documents and statutes, 
admit or deny their applicability, challenge their admissibility where obvious, and then 
admit or deny the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ construction of those documents and statutes.  
D. Inadequate Investigation 
Rule 11 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure requires investigation.343 As is 
well known, C.R.C.P. Rule 11 states that: 
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read 
the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed 
after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase 
in the cost of litigation.344  
The Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct also require investigation. Rule 3.1, 
titled Meritorious Claims and Contentions, specifies that: 
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an 
issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not 
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law.345 
Comment 2 to Rule 3.1 does allow that “[t]he filing of an action or defense or 
similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first 
been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only 
by discovery.”346 No one expects discovery to precede answering. “What is required 
of lawyers, however,” the comment explains, “is that they inform themselves about 
the facts of their clients’ cases and the applicable law and determine that they can 
make good faith arguments in support of their clients’ positions.”347 As with Rule 11, 
Rule 3.1 puts investigation at the representation’s core. 348  
 
342 See supra text accompanying notes 136–137.  
343 COLO. R. CIV. P. 11(a). 
344 Id. 
345 COLO. R.  PRO. CONDUCT 3.1. 
346 COLO. R.  PRO. CONDUCT 3.1 cmt. 2.  
347 Id. 
348 Id. Comment 2 further notes that: 
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Car crash cases are the model personal injury lawsuit.349 Roughly seven out of 
eight of Colorado’s drivers have car insurance.350 When cars crash and there is an 
injury, the drivers call their insurance companies.  
After learning of car crashes, liability insurers investigate. Car insurance 
companies are obliged to investigate and generally do so.351 An investigator opens a 
file, collects accident reports and other documents, takes a statement from the insured, 
calls other witnesses, and assembles a file called the claim file.352 This process is so 
routine that there are checklists.353 
When lawyers become involved as counsel for injured persons, they contact and 
negotiate with the other driver’s insurance company. If, for whatever reason, there is 
not already an open claim file before a lawyer contacts the insurer, then the auto 
liability insurer will open such a file immediately upon contact by the plaintiff’s 
lawyer.354 
All but one of the answers filed in the sample shows evidence of the involvement 
of an insurance company. There are only four pro se defendants in the sample.355 
 
Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the 
client’s position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, 
however, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on 
the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good 
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. 
 Id.; see also COLO. R. CIV. P. 11.  
349 See Engstrom, When Cars Crash, supra note 47, at 295 (quoting scholars who have 
observed that automobile claims are the paradigm for individualized dispute resolution in the 
tort system). 
350 Estimated Percentage of Uninsured Motorists by State - 2015, INS. INFO. INST., 
https://www.iii.org/table-archive/20641 [https://perma.cc/UVQ8-AFKJ]. 
351 COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104(h)(III) (2020) defines “[f]ailing to adopt and implement 
reasonable standards for the prompt investigation of claims arising under insurance policies” as 
among an array of “[u]nfair claim settlement practices.” Burgess v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 841 
P.2d 325, 328–29 (Colo. App. 1992). 
352 ROSS, supra note 41, at 87–96; Michael E. Brown & Jeffery A. Doty, Strategies for Counsel 
for the Insurer—Investigation of the Automobile Loss, 4 LAW AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE 
COVERAGE LITIGATION § 51:8 (June 2020) (stating that typically, the company file will contain 
a recorded statement of the policyholder and/or the claimant as well as witnesses). For first-
party property claims, the Colorado Division of Insurance has promulgated a rule concerning 
“Reasonable Investigation” that includes a list of sources that insurers may consult along with 
a list of what records the insurers must keep in claim files. 3 COLO. CODE REGS. § 702-5:5-1-
14(4)(B) (2020). 
353 See, e.g., KEN BROWNLEE & PAT MAGARICK, CASUALTY, FIRE AND MARINE INVESTIGATION 
CHECKLISTS § 9:1 (10th ed. 2019). 
354 4 LAW & PRACTICE OF INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION § 51:8, Westlaw (database 
updated June 2020). 
355 Answer to Complaint at 1, Mulholland v. Fernandez, No. 2015-CV30021 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 
Feb. 25, 2015) (Adams Cnty.); Complaint at 1, Jones v. Flores, No. 2015CV31497 (Colo. Dist. 
Ct. Apr. 28, 2015) (Denver Cnty.); Answer Under Simplified Civil Procedure at 2, Walker v. 
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Situations in which there existed no insurance claim files at the time of the filing 
of the lawsuit are, therefore, exceedingly rare. There is no authoritative data—no data 
at all, really—for how many filed car-crash lawsuits are the first news that a 
defendant’s insurance company has of a crash. For the filing of the lawsuit to be the 
first notice to the insurer, no one could have called the insurance company after the 
crash—not its insured, the injured person or persons, nor the police—and not the 
plaintiff’s lawyer once he or she undertook the representation. 
In the sampled lawsuits, plenty of time elapsed between the crashes and the filing 
of the lawsuits. The median number of days between the crash and the filing of the 
complaint was 727 days or just over twenty-three months. The mean time to file the 
complaint was 741 days, or just over two years.356 The shortest number of days from 
crash to complaint was twenty-one days, but only four of the 298 complaints were 
filed thirty days or fewer from the crash date. Plaintiffs’ attorneys do not rush to the 
courthouse to file car crash cases.  
Plaintiffs’ attorneys filed forty-four of the cases within one week of the three-year 
statute of limitations, whether through their own procrastination, because the injured 
persons waited a long time to find lawyers, or some other reason. Plaintiffs’ lawyers 
filed another fifteen cases beyond the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations 
for car crashes in Colorado, with the longest filed 2,393 days or 6.5 years after the 
crash. Some of the late filed car crash complaints were uninsured motorist or 
underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) cases in which the injured persons sued their own 
insurance companies for benefits because the tortfeasor’s insurance was either 
nonexistent or insufficient. Some late filed complaints may have been subject to 
tolling agreements in which the parties agreed to delay the filing of the case, and with 
some suits, perhaps the minority of the plaintiffs357—or another factor—tolled the 
running of the statute of limitations. 
Even the passage of many, many months from the crash to the filing of the 
complaint did not lead to the insurance defense mill attorney admitting to knowing 
facts that a reasonable investigation would have uncovered. For example, Sukey 
Austin filed suit against his insurer, USAA, on June 12, 2015, for a crash that had 
happened on August 1, 2009.358 His claim against USAA was for underinsured 
 
Cook, No. 2015CV30021 (Colo Dist. Ct. May 11, 2015) (La Plata Cnty.); Answer Under 
Simplified Civil Procedure at 1, Richards v. Shuler, No. 2015CV30540 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 21, 
2016) (Denver Cnty.). 
356 Because the crashes that led to litigation happened two years before the filing of the 
litigation and because the state collects most data on an annual basis, the above analysis of 
traffic volume and number of crashes looked at the 12-month period starting in July 2012 
through June 2013. 
357 Colorado law defines a “minor under eighteen years of age” as a “person under disability” 
unless the minor has a “legal guardian.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-81-101(3) (2020). An injured 
minor has three years or until his or her twentieth birthday, whichever is later, to file a car crash 
complaint, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-81-103(1)(c) (2020), except that there is no tolling of the 
statute if an injured minor at the time of the crash “is represented by a legal representative” such 
as a guardian. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-81-103(1)(a) (2020). 
358 Complaint and Jury Demand at 2, para. 7, Austin v. USAA Cas. Ins., No. 2015CV30489 
(Colo. Dist. Ct. June 12, 2015) (Larimer Cnty.) [hereinafter Austin Complaint]. 
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motorist benefits because the tortfeasor’s Farmers Insurance policy limits of $100,000 
were inadequate given his substantial injuries.359 Notwithstanding the passage of 
nearly six years from the crash to when Timms Fowler, Esq., filed suit on behalf of 
Mr. Austin; notwithstanding Mr. Fowler’s attachment of the traffic accident report as 
an exhibit to the complaint; and notwithstanding that Mr. Fowler likely sent demand 
letters and records to USAA attempting to settle the underinsured motorist claim; 
USAA’s lawyer Deana Dagner, Esq., of Dagner, Schluter, Mitzner & Werber LLC, 
claimed to be without sufficient information to answer thirty of the complaint’s forty-
three allegations.360 Ms. Dagner claimed not to be able to answer whether Mr. Austin 
lived “at all relevant times” in Larimer County nor that he now lived in El Paso 
County.361 About the accident, Ms. Dagner claimed insufficient information to be able 
to admit the date, time, or location of the accident; the name of the tortfeasor; the make 
or year of her car; her license plate number; the direction she was driving; or where 
she was headed.362 Ms. Dagner claimed not to be able to admit the color, year, and 
make of the vehicle that the plaintiff drove notwithstanding the fact that USAA was 
his insurer.363 The insurance defense mill lawyer also claimed insufficient information 
to admit Mr. Fowler’s allegation that the other driver got a ticket, the number of the 
ticket, and what part of the code she had allegedly violated. 364 Ms. Dagner refused to 
admit that the other driver failed to yield the right of way to Mr. Austin. 365 Ms. Dagner 
refused to admit that Mr. Austin was wearing his seat belt, a fact contained within the 
Traffic Accident Report.366 Ms. Dagner refused to admit that the vehicle of USAA’s 
insured was damaged or the dollar amount of the damage.367 USAA did admit that the 
plaintiff’s attorney, Mr. Fowler, gave notice to USAA of the possible UM/UIM claim 
and received permission from USAA to settle the claim for the $100,000 limit of the 
tortfeasor’s policy with Farmers Insurance.368 Notwithstanding these admissions, 
 
359 Id. at 5, para. 39. 
360 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 1–4; Austin Complaint, supra note 358, at 2, para. 7. 
361 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 2, para. 4 (Ms. Dagner refers to para. 5 but means para. 
4); Austin Complaint, supra note 358, at 2, para. 4. 
362 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 2, paras. 7–8; Austin Complaint, supra note 358, at 1–2. 
363 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 2, para. 9; Austin Complaint supra note 358, at 2, para. 
7. 
364 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 2, para. 10; Austin Complaint supra note 358, at 2, para. 
10. 
365 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 2, para. 11; Austin Complaint supra note 358, at 2, para. 
11. 
366 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 2, para. 14; Austin Complaint, supra note 358, at 3, para. 
14. 
367 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 3, para. 19; Austin Complaint, supra note 358, at 2, para. 
10. 
368 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 4–5, paras. 35–36; Austin Complaint, supra note 358, at 
5, paras. 35–36. 
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USAA’s lawyer denied knowing that the tortfeasor had settled with Mr. Austin, denied 
knowing the date on the check and the date of its receipt, and denied knowing that Mr. 
Austin “executed a General Release releasing [the driver] on July 19, 2013.”369 
Facts that USAA’s attorney Ms. Dagner claimed not to know were within USAA’s 
knowledge. In settling the claim with the underlying tortfeasor, the UM/UIM 
provisions of the USAA insurance policy obliged the plaintiff’s attorney, Mr. Fowler, 
to keep USAA apprised of the steps in his negotiation and settlement with Farmers 
Insurance.370 If USAA’s attorney, Ms. Dagner, disputed any of Mr. Fowler’s 
allegations on behalf of his client Mr. Austin, then she should have denied them. But, 
years after the crash and with a claim investigation file that had to be expansive, Ms. 
Dagner’s claims not to have sufficient information simply cannot be true unless USAA 
failed to provide her with its claim file due to USAA’s own bureaucratic 
incompetence. Bureaucratic dysfunction is one possible reason explaining the inability 
of defense lawyers to admit the most basic information that an insurer is obliged to 
collect as part of a reasonable investigation. However, were the file missing or 
incomplete, Ms. Dagner had plenty of time to collect that information herself after Mr. 
Fowler filed his June 12, 2015, complaint. She did not answer until November 16, 
2015, more than five months after Mr. Fowler filed the complaint. During that time, 
USAA’s lawyer might have conducted a reasonable investigation that was consistent 
with the insurance policy, Colorado law concerning unfair practices, and Rule 11. Her 
research would have yielded not only the color, make, and year of Mr. Austin’s car 
but would have resolved a slew of other facts Mr. Fowler alleged. For good measure, 
Ms. Dagner also refused to answer four allegations that called, she said, for a 
conclusion of law and, as noted above, she claimed that the USAA policy spoke for 
itself.371 Ms. Dagner concluded her answer with a prayer for relief asking that USAA, 
“having fully [sic] answered plaintiff’s Complaint and Jury Demand,” receive a 
judgment on its behalf.372 
Insurance defense mill attorneys have adequate time to answer complaints. Under 
Colorado’s Rules, the defendant has twenty-one days to answer a complaint.373 
However, plaintiffs’ lawyers routinely agree to allow additional time when a defense 
attorney asks. And, if a plaintiff’s lawyer refuses to allow additional time to answer, a 
judge could routinely grant additional time—and the uncooperative plaintiff’s lawyer 
could expect some harsh words from the court.374 
 
369 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 4, paras. 30–31; Austin Complaint, supra note 358, at 4, 
paras. 30–31. 
370 Austin Complaint, supra note 358, at 4–5, paras. 29–39. 
371 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 1, 4, paras. 1–3, 33. 
372 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 5–6. 
373 COLO. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1) (“A defendant shall file his answer or other response 
within 21 days after the service of the summons and complaint.”); accord FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(a)(1)(A)(i) (“A defendant must serve an answer within 21 days after being served with the 
summons and complaint . . . .”).  
374 COLO. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(B). 
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Defense attorneys answered just 10.7% or thirty-eight of the suits within twenty-
one days or fewer with eleven answers coming on day twenty-one. That is, only one 
out of ten attorneys answered within the twenty-one day deadline of Rule 12. One 
eager lawyer, Gregory Falls, Esq., answered on behalf of GEICO in an UM/UIM claim 
on the very day that the plaintiff’s attorney, Meloney Perry, Esq., filed the lawsuit.375 
Likely, Ms. Perry had shared a draft complaint with the defense attorney before filing, 
as Mr. Falls was able to admit several facts including, for example, details regarding 
the crash.376  
Defense lawyers took longer than Rule 12’s twenty-one days to answer 89.3% of 
the complaints. By four weeks after the filing of the complaint, defense lawyers had 
answered another 14.6% of the complaints, bringing the total number answered to just 
over one quarter of all complaints. During week five, they answered another 10.4% 
and another 10.1% the week after. By the end of seven weeks, there were answers in 
just over half of the lawsuits (53.5%). Overall, defendants’ lawyers filed their answers 
an average of seventy-nine days after the filing of the complaint, although the 
amendment and sometimes re-amendment of complaints and answers makes this 
number a bit squishy. The median number of days to answer—also a squishy 
number—is shorter, at forty-seven days, which is more than twice the number of days 
the rule specifies.377 The longest time from the filing of the complaint to answering is 
411 days, with this delay a function of actions of the attorneys for both the plaintiff 
and defendant. Overall, having to answer within twenty-one days of the filing was not 
a significant constraint. 
In car crash cases, a claim file nearly always exists. Plaintiffs’ lawyers are unlikely 
to file suit if there is no insurance. Lawyers know, long before filing, whether the 
potential defendant has insurance. For starters, the Traffic Accident Report “speaks” 
of the presence (or absence) of insurance. After signing a client, the plaintiff’s lawyer 
will contact the tortfeasor’s insurance carrier and generally send a letter of 
representation. If there is no coverage, then the plaintiff’s lawyer will usually explain 
to the client that there is no point in proceeding.  
On the other side, there is no excuse for the defense lawyer not reading the claim 
file before answering in order to answer based upon the facts therein. The insurance 
company need only share a digital copy of the file with the defense lawyer. The 
insurance defense mill attorney should also speak with the insured, who is also known 
as the client. The defense lawyer has contact information for the defendant—mobile 
phone numbers, email addresses, and physical address—and the insured defendant has 
 
375 Defendant GEICO Casualty Company’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint at 1, Gribble v. 
GEICO Cas. Co., No. 2015CV30535 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 2, 2015) (Adams Cnty.), Filing ID 
No. 7F8F7514D98F. 
376 Id. 
377 COLO. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1). 
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a duty under the policy to cooperate in his or her own defense.378 Ethically, the 
insurance defense mill lawyer is obliged to investigate before answering.379 
Given the existence of insurance claim files and the routineness of car crash claims, 
the twenty-one days that Rule 12 provides should be sufficient to answer. Indeed, if 
Rule 12’s provision of three weeks to answer is unrealistic, then the Colorado Supreme 
Court should revise the rule. When a defense attorney needs additional time, plaintiffs 
will generally agree, knowing that judges freely grant motions to enlarge time to 
answer.380  
Even in the unimaginably rare situation in which no claim file existed at the time 
of the filing of the lawsuit, the insurance companies would still have weeks during 
which they could investigate the crash, injuries, and claim before the insurance defense 
attorney would have to answer the complaint. Plaintiffs lawyers and, even more so, 
judges would freely grant a defense lawyer’s motion to enlarge time in order to 
investigate the claim before answering.381 
Insurance defense attorneys can speak with the client and read the claim file 
without ever leaving their desks. Personally, I also believe that they should leave their 
desks and visit the crash site, as nothing substitutes for in-person viewing.  
Why, then, is there so much evidence in the answers that the defense mill attorneys 
have not read the claim file, have not spoken to the defendants, and have never visited 
the scenes of the accidents? As with refusals to answer allegations that ask for a legal 
conclusion, concern a codefendant, or refer to a document, insurance defense mill 
lawyers’ practice is to delay by refusing to answer even when they could. 
IV. FRIVOLOUS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
This Article has not yet cataloged the truly frivolous aspects of insurance defense 
mill attorneys’ answers to complaints in car crash cases. Thus far, this Article has 
looked at insurance defense mill attorneys’ responses to the allegations within 
plaintiffs’ complaints. Defense attorneys ignore the clear pathway of Rule 8 and avoid 
 
378 Some defendants, of course, do not assist with their own defense nor live up to their 
obligations under the policy. See, e.g., Soicer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 351 P.3d 559, 
565 (Colo. App. 2015) (“Colorado law recognizes that the right to recover under an insurance 
policy may be forfeited when, in violation of a policy provision, the insured fails to cooperate 
with the insurer in some material and substantial respect and the failure to cooperate causes 
material and substantial disadvantage to the insurer.”).  
379 COLO. R.  PRO. CONDUCT 1.1 (“Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, 
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”); COLO. R.  
PRO. CONDUCT 1.3 (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client.”); COLO. R.  PRO. CONDUCT 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a 
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for 
doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law.”). 
380 COLO. R. CIV. P. 12.  
381 COLO. R. CIV. P. 6(b) (“When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of 
court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause 
shown may, at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice, order the period 
enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed . . 
. .”). 
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answering by claiming they need not respond to an allegation that calls for—or 
includes—a legal conclusion; that they can ignore allegations directed at another 
defendant; and that various documents—statutes, traffic accident reports, tickets, and 
insurance policies—speak for themselves. Notwithstanding the existence of claims-
investigation files, the passage of considerable time from the crash to the filing of the 
complaint, and generally, ample time to answer, defense attorneys also often claim 
insufficient information to answer and do not reveal that they know much of anything 
about their clients nor the crash. The defense attorneys’ responses depart from the 
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, which a judge once said to me are not the Colorado 
Suggestions for Civil Procedure.382 
The second part of the answer that defense attorneys file includes affirmative 
defenses. An affirmative defense takes the form of “If so, so what?”383 This means that 
the defense attorney claims that even if the defendant did what the plaintiff alleges, an 
affirmative defense shields the defendant from liability.384 The statute of limitations 
offers a simple example. A defense attorney could include an affirmative defense that 
says, even if the defendant caused the car crash and injuries as the plaintiff alleges, the 
crash was fifteen years ago, so the statute of limitations has run. If so, so what?385 
Colorado’s Rule 8(c) authorizes the inclusion of affirmative defenses and 
anticipates, at least implicitly, their inclusion after the defendant has answered the 
complaint’s allegations.386 Section (c) of Rule 8 is titled “Affirmative Defenses and 
Mitigating Circumstances.”387 Rule 8(c), like the federal rule,388 includes a 
nonexhaustive list of affirmative defenses, which the rule notes, “a party shall set forth 
affirmatively” when “pleading to a preceding pleading.”389 The affirmative defenses 
relevant to torts include assumption of risk, contributory negligence, injury by fellow 
servant, release, res judicata, statute of limitations, and a catchall for “any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.”390 Of relevance when the insurance 
defense mill lawyer wants to claim, for example, that that plaintiff did not receive 
 
382 COLO. SUG. CIV. PRO.  
383 I credit Dean Beto Juárez for this formulation. “Yes, but” is another version. 
384 See Salinas v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. B-10-194, 2011 WL 13254062, at *2–4 
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2011) (finding that some of a party's “affirmative defenses” were not true 
affirmative defenses). 
385 Russell, supra note 141, at Sections VI.D., VIII.D., IX.C. 
386 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
387 Id. 
388 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). 
389 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
390 Id. 
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enough or any medical treatment, Rule 8(c) specifies that “[a]ny mitigating 
circumstances to reduce the amount of damage shall be affirmatively pleaded.”391  
Of the 356 answers in the sample, 350 included a separate list of defenses. Some 
defense lawyers labeled their separate list as “affirmative defenses” and others simply 
as “defenses.” Technically speaking, many of the listed items were not true affirmative 
defenses in the “if so, so what?” form. The highest number of separate defenses was 
twenty-eight. Including the six answers with no separate defenses, both the median 
and average number of defenses for the car crash answers was nine. The standard 
deviation was 4.6. 
The list of nine “affirmative defenses” that Robert Jones, Esq., included in his 
answer on behalf of Rhonda Mills is typical of the work of insurance defense mill 
lawyers. On behalf of Nancy Severns, Amanda Francis, Esq., alleged that on January 
11, 2012, Ms. Severns was a passenger in a car that Ms. Mills hit after running a stop 
sign.392 After “answering” the complaint that Ms. Francis filed, Mr. Jones appended 
the following list: 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
1. That Plaintiff’s claims for damages against the Defendant are 
barred, reduced or governed by the contributory negligence or 
comparative fault of the driver of the automobile the Plaintiff was a 
passenger in in accordance with the provisions set forth in C.R.S. 
§13-21- 111, 111.5 and C.R.S. §13-50.5-101. et. seq. 
2. The alleged injuries and damages, if any, were proximately caused 
by unforeseeable intervening acts of third parties over whom the 
Defendant had neither control nor right of control. 
3. Defendant, without fault, faced a sudden emergency and acted 
reasonably under the circumstances. 
4. Plaintiff’s failure to take such reasonable steps as would have 
mitigated or minimized the alleged injuries and damages, which 
includes but is not limited to failure of the Plaintiff, Nancy Severns 
to utilize a safety belt system, precludes recovery on those injuries 
and damages pursuant to C.R.S. § 42-4-237(7) 7 [sic]. 
5. The Plaintiff’s damages, if any, are barred or limited by the 
provisions of C.R.S. § 13-21- 102.5 (limitations on damages for 
non-economic loss or injury). 
6. Plaintiff’s claims for damages are barred or reduced as such 
damages were proximately caused by unrelated prior and/or 
subsequent events for which the Defendant is not responsible. 
 
391 Id. The rule also notes that “[w]hen a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a 
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat 
the pleading as if there had been a proper designation.” Id. 
392 Civil Complaint at 2, paras. 8, 10, Severns v. Mills, No. 2015CV30033 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 
9, 2015) (Douglas Cnty.). 
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7. The Plaintiff named herein may not be the real party in interest to 
prosecute all or a portion of the claim in question. 
8. The Plaintiff’s recovery is barred or reduced by payment from a 
collateral source pursuant to the provisions of C.R.S. §13-21-111.6. 
9. The Defendants respectfully reserves [sic] the right to amend this 
Answer in the future to include additional affirmative defenses as 
discovery reveals are appropriate. To the extent the law and/or facts 
in this matter currently support any affirmative defense listed in 
C.R.C.P. 8(c) not heretofore stated, and/or to the extent any facts or 
law later discovered or enacted support any such defenses, such 
defenses are hereby affirmatively plead.393 
Mr. Jones’s list of “affirmative defenses” is what plaintiffs’ lawyers face after 
filing complaints. The first item in the list is not an affirmative defense at all. The first 
item simply refers to Colorado’s law on comparative fault,394 pro-rata liability of 
defendants according to fault,395 and then refers to Colorado’s enactment of the 
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.396 Mr. Jones includes no facts 
whatsoever with this “affirmative defense.” He does not, for example, include any 
factual allegation that Ms. Severns was herself negligent. Therefore, this allegation 
does not in any way put Ms. Severns or her attorney on notice that Mr. Jones will be 
trying to prove comparative fault. The effect of the “affirmative defense” is nothing 
more than to say that Colorado law regarding comparative fault and pro-rata 
apportionment apply, but the law would apply regardless of whether he cites the 
statutes. As for the reference to the Uniform Act—a particularly gnarly statute in my 
view as a torts professor—the statute applies without Mr. Jones’s saying so but has no 
application given there is but one defendant and therefore no need for contribution 
among tortfeasors. In all, the first “affirmative defense” is at best a waste of words that 
says that the law applies, though at worst, the “affirmative defense” might establish—
depending on the judge—that Mr. Jones has successfully put the plaintiff’s lawyer on 
notice of a comparative fault defense without alleging any factual basis. 
Other of the nine “affirmative defenses” in Mr. Jones’s list also do nothing more 
than pointlessly refer to applicable law. For example, the fifth item in the list states 
that “[t]he Plaintiff’s damages, if any, are barred or limited by the provisions of C.R.S. 
§ 13-21-102.5 (limitations on damages for non-economic loss or injury).”397 With this 
provision of the state’s statutes, the Colorado General Assembly capped damages for 
noneconomic loss.398 In 2015, the cap for non-economic loss—pain and suffering or 
 
393 Defendant Rhonda M. Mills’ Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 2–3, Severns, No. 
2015CV30033 [hereinafter Severns Answer]. 
394 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (2020). 
395 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (2020). 
396 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-50.5-101 (2020). 
397 Severns Answer, supra note 393, at 3, para. 5. 
398 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5(1) (2020). 
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general damages—was $366,250, which could double with clear and convincing 
evidence.399 Inclusion of the citation of the damages cap is not an affirmative defense, 
and citation of the cap is neither necessary for the cap to be in effect nor useful in any 
way. 
Mr. Jones’s eighth item in his list of affirmative defenses is also pointless.400 Mr. 
Jones cites Colorado’s amendment of the collateral source rule.401 Mr. Jones includes 
no facts. Without the citation of the statute, the law would still apply. The first, fifth, 
and eight “affirmative defenses” do nothing other than state that Colorado law applies. 
With his second “affirmative defense,” Mr. Jones claims that “[t]he alleged injuries 
and damages, if any, were proximately caused by unforeseeable intervening acts of 
third parties over whom the Defendant had neither control nor right of control.”402 
This, too, is not an affirmative defense but rather a suggestion of an attack on the 
plaintiff’s case-in-chief. That is, Mr. Jones suggests with this “affirmative defense” 
that someone else caused the harm, but he does not suggest who that might be. If, 
indeed, his client Ms. Mills was not driving the car and did not run a stop sign and 
crash into Ms. Severns, then the plaintiff (and the court) might reasonably expect to 
hear that claim in the answer, which Mr. Jones filed more than six months after the 
filing of the complaint and more than three and a half years after the crash. Indeed, if 
any truth lay behind this allegation, then the plaintiff’s attorney would likely have 
dumped the case long before filing. But, of course, no facts lay behind the boilerplate 
language of this or other of Mr. Jones’s “affirmative defenses.”  
Mr. Jones’s fourth “affirmative defense” misstates the law and also is fact-free. 
Mr. Jones states that “Defendant, without fault, faced a sudden emergency and acted 
reasonably under the circumstances.”403 Mr. Jones attempts to state what torts students 
know as the sudden emergency doctrine. A sudden emergency is, however, not a 
defense; a sudden emergency is a circumstance relevant to whether the defendant 
exercised reasonable care under the circumstances.404 Moreover, the Colorado 
Supreme Court had, in 2013, eliminated sudden emergency from the state’s pattern 
jury instructions and abolished the doctrine.405 For the court, then-Justice and later 
Chief Justice Nancy Rice wrote: “[w]e hold that Colorado negligence law no longer 
requires the sudden emergency instruction and that the instruction’s potential to 
 
399 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5 (2015), amended by COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-
102.5(3)(c)(III) (2019) (increasing the limitations on general damages to $468,010, which may 
be raised to a maximum of $936,030 on clear and convincing evidence); see COLO. SEC’Y OF 
STATE, ADJUSTED LIMITATIONS FOR DAMAGES PURSUANT TO C.R.S. 13-21-102.5(3)(c)(III) 
(2020), https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/info_center/files/damages_new.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8GPL-CXC9] (order of the Secretary of State increasing limitations on 
general damages). 
400 Severns Answer, supra note 393, at 3, para. 5. 
401 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.6 (2020). 
402 Severns Answer, supra note 393, at 2, para. 2. 
403 Id. at 2, para. 3. 
404 DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 190, at 50–52.  
405 Bedor v. Johnson, 292 P.3d 924, 925 (Colo. 2013) (en banc). 
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mislead the jury outweighs its minimal utility.”406 More than two years before Mr. 
Jones filed his list of affirmative defenses, she had written: “[w]e therefore abolish the 
sudden emergency doctrine.”407  
Mr. Jones’s fourth “affirmative defense” is one of the two items in the list that 
comes closest to being a true affirmative defense, and with this item, he swerves 
closest to including a fact. The first part of the fourth defense is that “Plaintiff’s failure 
to take such reasonable steps as would have mitigated or minimized the alleged 
injuries and damages . . . precludes recovery on those injuries and damages pursuant 
to C.R.S. § 42-4-237(7) 7 [sic].”408 Mr. Jones tucks the second part of the defense, 
commonly known as the seat belt defense, into the middle of the item as a 
nonrestrictive clause set off by commas—“which includes but is not limited to failure 
of the Plaintiff, Nancy Severns[,] to utilize a safety belt system”—and then returns to 
cite only that part of Colorado’s title 42 that refers to seat belt nonuse.409 This 
affirmative defense may have two parts, with the first being a general failure to 
mitigate damages and the second a failure to avoid consequences by wearing a 
seatbelt.410 To the extent that Mr. Jones intends to plead a failure to mitigate other than 
with regard to seatbelt use, he has run afoul of Rule 8(c)’s specific requirement that 
“[a]ny mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damage shall be affirmatively 
pleaded.”411 His fact-free claim includes no circumstances. Regarding seat belts, for 
the moment I will assume that he is alleging as fact that Ms. Severns failed to wear 
her seatbelt while a passenger on the day of the crash, a datum to which the Traffic 
Accident Report would speak. If Mr. Jones were to prove that Ms. Severns was not 
wearing her seatbelt as the Motor Vehicle Code required, then the statutory section 
that he cited provides that the evidence “shall be admissible to mitigate damages with 
respect to any person who was involved in a motor vehicle accident and who seeks in 
any subsequent litigation to recover damages for injuries resulting from the 
accident.”412 Nonuse of a seatbelt can reduce recovery for pain and suffering but not 
economic loss including damages for medical costs.413 
Mr. Jones’s sixth “affirmative defense,” like his second, is not an affirmative 
defense but instead is a vague attack on the plaintiff’s case-in-chief. The listed item is 
that “Plaintiff’s claims for damages are barred or reduced as such damages were 
proximately caused by unrelated prior and/or subsequent events for which the 
 
406 Id. at 927. 
407 Id.  
408 Severns Answer, supra note 393, at 3, para. 4 (the second numerical 7 after citation to the 
statute is a typographical error); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-237(7) (2020). 
409 Severns Answer, supra note 393, at 3, para. 4. 
410 ROBERTSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 418. My former colleagues at The University of Texas 
School of Law helpfully distinguish these concepts. 
411 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
412 COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-237(7) (2020). 
413 Id. 
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Defendant is not responsible.”414 Again, this fact-free language puts the plaintiff and 
court on notice of nothing at all. If the matter were to go to trial, and Ms. Severns’ 
lawyer failed to prove that Ms. Mills caused her harm, then Mr. Jones could move at 
the trial’s midpoint for a directed verdict. He could make that motion without having 
included the sixth “affirmative defense” in his answer. His claim about unrelated 
events is not an affirmative defense at all, plus he alleges no facts whatsoever to 
support the claim. He does not, for example, allege that Ms. Severns was injured in a 
prior car crash nor that after the car crash, she injured herself while snowboarding or 
walking her dog. 
The seventh item is also almost a bona fide affirmative defense albeit one that Mr. 
Jones has pleaded without any factual support. The seventh item in the list is that “[t]he 
Plaintiff named herein may not be the real party in interest to prosecute all or a portion 
of the claim in question.”415 Like the federal rule, Colorado’s Rule 17 specifies that 
“[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.”416 The 
person injured when another driver runs a stop sign is the real party in interest, even 
if there are various insurers who paid crash-related property or medical costs and may 
themselves hold subrogation claims. Exactly how a defense attorney should raise the 
claim that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest is unclear. The leading 
commenter, Stephen A. Hess, notes: 
Colorado rules do not explicitly designate the procedure for raising an 
objection that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest. However, the cases 
indicate, and the federal authorities confirm, that the challenge may be raised 
either as an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) or in a pretrial motion under 
Rule 12(b).417  
Mr. Jones pleaded this claim without factual support, but this groundlessness is not 
what makes this item only “almost” an affirmative defense. Mr. Jones uses the “may” 
rather than “is.” This is perhaps an acknowledgment that no factual support can exist 
for the claim. 
Finally, Mr. Jones’s ninth claim (the eighth I addressed above as a mere statement 
of existing Colorado law) is a weird catchall in three separate parts.418 The first 
sentence is “The Defendant respectfully reserves the right to amend this Answer in the 
future to include additional affirmative defenses as discovery reveals are 
appropriate.”419 With this sentence, the insurance defense mill lawyer tries to expand 
the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure’s already liberal rules for amendment of 
pleadings. Like its federal counterpart, Colorado Rule 15(a) allows for a party to 
 
414 Severns Answer, supra note 393, at 3, para. 6. 
415 Id. at 3, para. 7. 
416 COLO. R. CIV. P. 17(a); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a). 
417 STEPHEN A. HESS, HANDBOOK ON CIVIL LITIGATION § 4:2 (2020), Westlaw (database 
updated Oct. 2020). 
418 Severns Answer, supra note 393, at 3, para. 9. 
419 Id. Reserving the right to add affirmative defenses has no legal effect. See Russell, supra 
note 141, at 146. 
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“amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive 
pleading is filed.”420 More important, the defendant may amend with permission of 
the plaintiff or the court, with the rule specifying that “leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires.”421 Plaintiffs’ lawyers faced with requests for amendment should 
ask the court to consider whether the claims-investigation file that existed at the time 
the insurance defense mill attorney answered included facts that the defense attorney 
might have included when making a list of affirmative defenses. If so, then justice 
might not require that the judge permit amendment. Enforcing the provision for 
amendment as written might encourage defense lawyers to incorporate facts into their 
affirmative defenses. In any event, nothing about the Rules of Civil Procedure allows 
the party to expand the scope of Rule 15 by simply saying so at the end of a list of 
affirmative defenses. 
The second sentence of Mr. Jones’s final “affirmative defense” is a bit of magical 
realism that incorporates time travel. Mr. Jones writes that “[t]o the extent the law 
and/or facts in this matter currently support any affirmative defense listed in C.R.C.P. 
8(c) not heretofore stated, and/or to the extent any facts or law later discovered or 
enacted support any such defenses, such defenses are hereby affirmatively plead.”422 
The first long clause remarkably claims that Mr. Jones pleads as an affirmative defense 
any of the defenses that Rule 8(c) lists if at the time he answers, there exist facts or 
law in support of such defense. If effective, this would be an awesome way for the 
defense attorney to avoid doing any investigation, research, or reading of the 
investigation file. She or he could simply say that I have already pleaded all defenses 
that existing facts or law support, even though I have no idea what those facts or law 
are and, therefore, the plaintiff’s attorney and plaintiff cannot possibly have any idea 
whatsoever, either. Carrying this magic into the future, Mr. Jones adds that when he 
later discovers facts (perhaps by actually reading the claim-investigation file?) or 
uncovers law or the legislature passes new law, then those facts and law will coalesce 
into new affirmative defenses that he has already pleaded and that may, perhaps, 
magically appear in his pleadings without having to resort to Rule 15 amendment.  
I understand the second part of the last item in Mr. Jones’s list of “affirmative 
defenses” in several ways. Most importantly, my opinion is that an insurance defense 
mill attorney who uses this type of language is implicitly admitting to having failed to 
read the claim-investigation file, investigate the claim himself or herself, research the 
law, and speak with the client. Knowing of these professional and ethical failures, the 
attorney nonetheless wishes to establish the affirmative defenses his or her client 
would be entitled to make had the attorney acted ethically and professionally. Second, 
I see these claims roughly like middle school children reserving cafeteria tables with 
their backpacks on the way into the lunchroom or like Bostonians claiming a property 
 
420 COLO. R. CIV. P. 15(a); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). 
421 COLO. R. CIV. P. 15(a). Compare id., with FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) (allowing, under subsection 
(1) amendment as a matter of course within 21 days and in other circumstances, while 
subsection (2) notes that “[i]n all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the 
opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when 
justice so requires.”). 
422 Severns Answer, supra note 393, at 3, para. 9. 
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right by placing chairs in parking spaces they have shoveled.423 Neither the middle 
schoolers nor the Bostonians are making actual legal claims, although they do 
generally get what they want. 
No one should be surprised that lawyers reuse parts of pleadings and motions. For 
the sake of efficiency and also for the sake of making some money, lawyers adapt 
previous work-product to new clients. From the biggest Wall Street firms to solo 
practitioners in small towns, all lawyers do this. Oddly, Professor Engstrom seems 
offended when lawyers operate efficiently.424 
There is, however, a difference between adapting the work done for a previous 
client and simply cutting and pasting. Like other insurance defense mill lawyers, Mr. 
Jones simply cut and pasted his list of affirmative defenses—including a typographical 
error. Likely, a legal assistant or paralegal did the actual cutting and pasting. The list 
of “affirmative defenses” that Mr. Jones included in his answer to the lawsuit against 
State Farm insured Ms. Mills was, character-for-character identical to the one that he 
had included in defending T. Jay Alvarado and his employer Service Master of 
Colorado Springs.425 Every jot and tittle of the nine defenses listed above had appeared 
in the answer that Jones had filed a few months earlier including the typographical 
error in referring to “C.R.S. § 42-4-237(7) 7.” The final 7 in this string is a typo, as 
subsection (7) has no subparts and, if it did, they would be lettered not numbered.426  
The only difference between Mr. Jones’s two lists is with the fourth “affirmative 
defense” regarding seat belts. In the April answer, this item refers to “the Plaintiffs, 
Bobbie Jackson and Adam Jackson.”427 The June answer substitutes Nancy Severns 
and remembers to make Plaintiffs singular.428 Again, whether Mr. Jones or nonlawyer 
State Farm staff made these changes is presently unknown. 
Cutting and pasting would be acceptable if insurance defense mills adapted each 
affirmative defense to the facts of each complaint after reading the claim-investigation 
file and interviewing the client. Rather than cutting and pasting, the defense attorneys 
and their staffs might use templates. A template might say, for example, “the plaintiff 
was comparatively at fault because [he or she] [insert facts concerning the Plaintiff’s 
negligence].” Perhaps the plaintiff was talking on the phone, not driving in her lane, 
failed to use his signal, or any other thing. A template that includes a list of affirmative 
 
423 See PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM 
EVERYDAY LIFE (1998). This book’s cover features a chair holding a shoveler’s property interest 
in a Boston parking spot.  
424 See Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1493 (“At settlement mills, it is 
assumed that claims will be straightforward. Standardized and routinized procedures are then 
designed and employed in keeping with that assumption. Efficiency trumps process and 
quality.”). 
425 Defendants T. Jay Alvarado and Egeler Enterprises, Inc. DBA Service Master of Colorado 
Springs’ Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 3–4, Jackson v. Alvarado, No. 
2015CV30810 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 27, 2015) (El Paso Cnty.), Filing ID No. 5A4FAF62A38B5 
[hereinafter Jackson Answer]. 
426 COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-237(1)(a) (2020). 
427 Jackson Answer, supra note 425, at 1. 
428 Severns Answer, supra note 393, at 3. 
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defenses and that prompts the insurance defense mill attorney to add facts would 
satisfy the factual commands of Rules 11 and 8. Cutting and pasting without facts does 
not. 
Going through every insurance defense mill attorney’s list of defenses would be 
tedious for this Article’s dear readers; imagine how infuriating the lists are for the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys! Simply describing and analyzing one list takes pages. A motion 
to strike or to flesh them out takes even more time and text. 
Insurance defense mill attorneys working for GEICO employed an approach very 
similar to that of Mr. Jones on behalf of the State Farm insureds. With an asterisk, 
attorneys in the office of Elizabeth A. Kleger & Associates identify themselves as 
“Employees of Government Employees Insurance Company.”429 Answers by firm 
attorneys make clear that they share their laundry lists of affirmative defenses within 
the firm even though each attorney may tailor the list somewhat. Thus, in an answer 
that Kianna Jackson, Esq., filed on August 7, 2015, in response to an amended 




1. The failure to take such reasonable steps as would have mitigated or 
minimized the alleged injuries and damages precludes recovery on 
these injuries and damages. 
2. The alleged injuries and damages, if any, may have existed before 
the occurrence complained of and recovery therefore may be 
precluded or diminished as required by law. 
3. The alleged injuries and damages, if any, may have resulted from 
injuries incurred after the occurrence complained of and recovery 
therefore may be precluded or diminished as required by law. 
4. The alleged injuries and damages, if any, may have been 
proximately caused by unforeseeable intervening acts of third 
parties over whom the Defendant had no control nor right of control. 
5. The Plaintiff named herein may not be the real party in interest to 
prosecute all or a portion of the claim in question. 
6. The Defendant’s liability, if any, is limited to that amount 
represented by Defendant’s pro rata share of negligence for fault, if 
any, producing the claimed injury or loss. 
7. The Plaintiff’s claims may be barred or limited by the collateral 
source rule of C.R.S. §13-21-111.6. 
8. Per C.R.S. § 13-21-111.5(3)(b), Defendant designates the driver of 
Plaintiffs’ vehicle, Mr. Louis Daniel, as a negligent non-party. 
 
429 Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 1, Salazar v. MacNaughton, No. 2015CV31851 
(Colo. Dist. Ct. June 22, 2015) (Denver Cnty.) [hereinafter Salazar Answer]; Answer to 
Complaint and Jury Demand at 1, Crayton v. Zachary, No. 2105CV32342 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Aug. 
7, 2015) (Denver Cnty.) [hereinafter Crayton Answer]. 
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9. The Defendant respectfully requests the right to amend this Answer 
in the future to include additional affirmative defenses as discovery 
reveals are apparent.430 
As with Mr. Jones’s list, there are no facts to support these “affirmative defenses” 
and, in my opinion, no indication, apart perhaps from the attempt to designate a 
nonparty, that Ms. Jackson had read the claim file nor interviewed her client before 
answering. Like Mr. Jones’s list, few of the items are true affirmative defenses, several 
suggest possible attacks on the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, and others pointlessly refer to 
existing Colorado law. Like Mr. Jones, Ms. Jackson uses the final item in the list to 
“respectfully request the right to amend” the answer, although, as noted above, Rule 
15 liberally allows amendment and sets out a procedure.431 With the eighth item, Ms. 
Jackson tried to designate the driver of the plaintiff’s car as a nonparty, which is 
neither an affirmative defense nor quite the right way to designate a nonparty.432 
Skye McCulloch, Esq., a colleague of Ms. Jackson’s at Elizabeth A. Kleger & 
Associates, cut and pasted from the same source as Ms. Jackson. Ms. McCulloch filed 
an answer on June 22, 2015, for a crash that happened on August 8, 2013.433 Ms. 
McCulloch’s first item in her list of “affirmative defenses” was, character-for-
character identical to the first item in the list that Ms. Jackson would file in her August 
answer.434 Five other of Ms. McCulloch’s items differed from Ms. Jackson’s items by 
just a single word. Three of Ms. McCulloch’s were distinct but still pointless—one 
purported to raise the seatbelt defense, another stated the cap on non-economic loss, 
and a third stated, of course without facts, that the defendant might be entitled to set-
off.435 Again, there is nothing wrong with cutting and pasting for the sake of efficiency 
within a firm, but, in my opinion, there is everything wrong professionally and 
ethically with listing items as affirmative defenses that have no factual predicate and 
that suggest or reveal that the attorney has failed to investigate. 
The single word that distinguished the Ms. Jackson and Ms. McCulloch’s answers 
on behalf of GEICO and its insured was “may.” As with the Jones list, Ms. Jackson 
included the word “may” in five of the nine items on her list—the plaintiff’s injuries 
“may have existed before”; the damages “may have resulted from injuries incurred 
after”; the injuries “may have been proximately caused by” unrelated third parties; and 
the plaintiff “may not be the real party in interest.”436 As noted above, the use of 
“may,” even if the attorneys included facts, turns these items into garbage. The 
 
430 Crayton Answer, supra note 429, at 2–3. 
431 Id. at 3, para. 9. 
432 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (2020) (“The notice shall be given by filing a pleading 
in the action designating such nonparty and setting forth such nonparty's name and last-known 
address, or the best identification of such nonparty which is possible under the circumstances, 
together with a brief statement of the basis for believing such nonparty to be at fault.”). 
433 Salazar Answer, supra note 429, at 1. 
434 Id. at 3; Crayton Answer, supra note 429, at 2. 
435 Salazar Answer, supra note 429, at 3. 
436 Crayton Answer, supra note 429, at 2. 
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standard of proof in civil claims is a preponderance of evidence; “may” is always less 
than a preponderance. 
For GEICO, Ms. McCulloch, who used the word “may” only once, instead hedged 
her list with a 148-word introduction. Nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure 
authorizes or creates a need for such an introduction. “The Rules of Civil Procedure 
require every Defendant to plead potential Affirmative Defenses at the time the 
Answer is filed,” Ms. McCulloch correctly wrote, “or risk a determination,” she 
continued, that “the potential Affirmative Defenses are waived, even though no 
disclosures have been exchanged, and no right of discovery exists, at the time the 
Answer is filed.”437 As noted above, Rule 8(c) offers a nonexclusive list of affirmative 
defenses, many of which apply specifically to personal injury cases, and states that 
“[i]n pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth . . . any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.”438 However, Ms. McCulloch’s 
claim about waiver of affirmative defenses is a bit dramatic because of the leniency, 
already described, of Rule 15 and also because, as Mr. Hess comments, Colorado 
“courts have been reluctant to allow forfeiture of affirmative defenses where the 
defendant tries to raise the defense through some other means and there is no prejudice 
to the plaintiff. Consequently,” Mr. Hess continues, “several cases have allowed a 
defendant to raise an affirmative defense in briefs on a motion for summary 
judgment.”439 Furthermore, Ms. McCulloch’s complaint that she had to assert defenses 
when answering rather than after conducting discovery rings hollow. She took twenty-
seven days to answer the complaint, and GEICO had 656 days from the date of the 
crash to the filing of the complaint to investigate.440 The claim-investigation file surely 
would have allowed her to plead at least a single fact in her list of affirmative defenses. 
Instead, Ms. McCulloch moaned in the second sentence of her introduction, “the 
following Affirmative Defenses are necessarily pled based only upon information and 
belief.”441  
Like other insurance defense mill attorneys, Ms. McCulloch attempted to enlarge 
the Rules of Civil Procedure to her own benefit: “Defendant reserves the right,” she 
proclaimed in the third sentence, “to seek leave to add, withdraw, and/or modify 
Affirmative Defenses once disclosures are exchanged, discovery is received, or other 
information is obtained.”442 Strangely, she also noted that, “[i]n identifying the 
following as ‘Affirmative Defenses,’ Defendant does not imply the burden of proof or 
of going forward with evidence has shifted, as that is a matter for Court 
 
437 Salazar Answer, supra note 429, at 2–3. 
438 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(c).  
439 HESS, supra note 417, § 3:4 (citing Bebo Const. Co. v. Mattox & O'Brien, P.C., 990 P.2d 
78 (Colo. 1999)); see, e.g., Cox v. Pearl Inv. Co., 450 P.2d 60, 61–62 (Colo. 1969); Drake v. 
Tyner, 914 P.2d 519, 521–22 (Colo. App. 1996); Alien, Inc. v. Futterman, 924 P.2d 1063, 1068 
(Colo. App. 1995). 
440 Salazar Answer, supra note 429, at 1. 
441 Id. at 3. 
442 Id.  
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determination.”443 As defendant’s counsel, she would have the burden of proving 
affirmative defenses that she asserted; that’s the idea!  
With the final sentence of her introduction to her list of “affirmative defenses,” 
Ms. McCulloch implicitly revealed, as other insurance defense mill lawyers also have, 
that she understood she was violating the Rules of Civil Procedure. “Pursuant to Rule 
11,” she promised, “any defense that is not supported by the evidence, upon 
completion of discovery, will be withdrawn prior to the start of trial.”444 As I discuss 
below, Rule 11 requires both an investigation and a factual basis for any defenses 
before an insurance defense mill lawyer pleads those defenses.445 I understand Ms. 
McCulloch’s promise to withdraw frivolous or groundless defenses “prior to the start 
of trial” to be an admission that she violated Rule 11 with her answer. Ms. McCulloch 
inserted the same introduction to affirmative defense in all but one of eleven of her 
answers that are in the sample.446 In one answer, though, she or her paralegal inserted 





445 COLO. R. CIV. P. 11(a). 
446 Ms. McCulloch filed 11 of the answers in the sample. On average, she answered 57 days 
after the filing of the complaint. See, e.g., Salazar Answer, supra note 429, at 2–3; Answer to 
Complaint and Jury Demand at 3, Norwood v. Oetken, No. 2015CV32323M (Colo. Dist. Ct. 
Sept. 11, 2015) (Denver Cnty.); Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 2, McKenna v. 
Rackliff, No. 2015CV30776 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Aug. 31, 2015) (Jefferson Cnty.) [hereinafter 
McKenna Answer]; Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 3, Mays v. Hague, No. 
2015CV30021E (Colo. Dist. Ct. May 15, 2015) (Jefferson Cnty.); Answer to Complaint and 
Jury Demand at 2, Benavidez v. Meyers, No. 2015CV31427 (Colo. Dist. Ct. May 11, 2015) 
(Denver Cnty.); Defendant French’s Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 5, Carter v. 
Marshall, No. 2015CV30517 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 30, 2015) (Arapahoe Cnty.); Answer to 
Complaint and Jury Demand at 3, Lucero v. Barry, No. 2015CV30245 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 14, 
2015) (Denver Cnty.); Defendant Caitlin Butler’s Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 4, 
Britain v. Butler, No. 2015CV30712 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 10, 2015) (Denver Cnty.); Answer to 
Complaint and Jury Demand at 2, Turner v. Settle, No. 2015CV30670 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 2, 
2015) (El Paso Cnty.); Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 4, Norris v. Ross, No. 
2015CV30336 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Feb. 23, 2015) (Denver Cnty.); Answer to Complaint and Jury 
Demand at 3, Cook-Heisser v. Winters, No. 2015CV30094 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Feb. 9, 2015) 
Jefferson Cnty.). 
447 McKenna Answer, supra note 446, at 2. Two other insurance defense mills, Senter, 
Goldfarb & Rice, LLC, and Overturf McGath & Hull, P.C., used the identical introduction to 
their own lists of affirmative defenses. See Answer and Jury Demand at 2, Sefcovic v. Riggan, 
No. 2015CV30303 (Colo. Dist. Ct. May 4, 2015) (Douglas Cnty.); Defendant Robert Graham’s 
Answer & Jury Demand to Plaintiff’s Complaint at 6, Yankey v. Graham, No. 2015CV30013 
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Mar. 19, 2015) (Arapahoe Cnty.). The exact mechanism by which this text 
diffused among the insurance defense mills is unknown. Deana Dagner used a similar 
introduction to her list of fact-free affirmative defenses. See Defendant Polunci’s Answer to 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial at 4, Magill v. Ford Motor Co., 
No. 2015CV32019 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Nov. 23, 2015) (Denver Cnty.). 
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As noted, defense lawyers asserted an average of nine different defenses in their 
lists of “affirmative defenses.” Few were true affirmative defenses. In support of these 
affirmative defenses, the attorneys pleaded almost no facts. The median number of 
facts that attorneys pleaded in support of their entire list of affirmative defenses was 
zero. Indeed, 196 of the 356 answers included no facts in their assertion of affirmative 
defenses. That is, more than half the answers contained no facts whatsoever in support 
of any of the items in the list of defenses. The greatest number of facts in any answer 
was four; the mean was one half. Again, that is an average of one-half of a fact pleaded 
in support of the entire list of affirmative defenses, not one-half of a fact for each 
defense. 
However, even the figure of one-half fact per list of defenses is misleadingly high. 
When coding the answers, I counted the assertion of the seat belt defense as a fact. As 
my subthesis is that defense attorneys do not plead facts, I interpreted the assertion of 
the seat belt defense conservatively against my thesis. So, I counted as a fact the claim 
that the plaintiff may not have been wearing a seat belt, whereas I did not count as a 
fact the bald claim that the plaintiff was also—or may have been—at fault for no 
specified reason. Of the 160 answers that included from one to four facts, 130 of those 
asserted that the plaintiff was not wearing a seat belt. As in other states, compliance 
with the law that requires seat belts is quite high in Colorado with 80.7% of drivers 
wearing their seat belts in 2012 and 82.1% in 2013.448 Without success, I attempted to 
collect a subsample of Traffic Accident Reports for a number of the crashes in order 
to see what the reports said about whether the plaintiff had been wearing a seat belt 
and to determine whether crashes included an unrepresentative sample of seat belt 
nonwearers. My conclusion is that the assertion of the seat belt defense is not truly the 
assertion of a fact, rather, the defense attorney is simply taking a shot in the dark. 
Excluding the assertion of the seat belt defense as a fact reduced the number of 
answers that asserted any facts at all to thirty-five. That is, only in 9.8% of the answers 
did the insurance defense mill attorneys marshal any fact at all in support of the entire 
list of affirmative defenses they asserted. Scandalous! Thus reduced, the average 
number of facts that defense attorneys pleaded in support of each list of affirmative 
defenses was 0.14. Again, this is not 0.14 facts per affirmative defense; this is 0.14 
facts per list of affirmative defenses. Shameful! 
Colorado’s statutes provide for attorney fees “against any attorney or party who 
has brought or defended a civil action, either in whole or in part, that the court 
determines lacked substantial justification.”449 In 1977, the General Assembly claimed 
to “recognize[] that courts of record of this state have become increasingly burdened 
with litigation which is straining the judicial system and interfering with the effective 
administration of civil justice.”450 The legislators responded “to this problem” with 
“provisions for the recovery of attorney fees in courts of record when the bringing or 
defense of an action, or part thereof (including any claim for exemplary damages), is 
determined to have been substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or 
 
448 COLO. DEP’T OF TRANSP. & COLO. STATE UNIV. INST. OF TRANSP. MGMT., 2013 STATE OF 
COLORADO STATEWIDE SEATBELT SURVEY (2013), 
https://www.codot.gov/library/surveys/2013cdotstatewide.pdf [https://perma.cc/534C-4T2T]. 
449 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-17-102(2) (2021). 
450 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-17-101 (2016). 
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substantially vexatious.”451 The terms of the statutory provisions apply equally to 
plaintiffs and defendants.452 Even so, during the forty-three years since the General 
Assembly took action against frivolous claims, one hears of “frivolous lawsuits” but 
not of “frivolous defenses.” 
The legislature directs that “[t]he court shall assess attorney fees if, upon the 
motion of any party or the court itself, it finds that an attorney or party brought or 
defended an action, or any part thereof, that lacked substantial justification.”453 The 
statute further specified that “‘lacked substantial justification’ means substantially 
frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious.”454 Subsequent 
litigation has allowed Colorado courts to further refine the definitions of groundless 
and frivolous. For example, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals held that “[a] 
claim is frivolous if the proponent can present no rational argument based on the 
evidence or law in support of the claim. A claim is groundless if the allegations in the 
complaint, while sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
are not supported by any credible evidence.”455 Groundlessness and frivolousness 
overlap while differing slightly in some way that is unimportant to my argument. 
Rule 11 bolsters the threat of an award of attorney fees. Colorado’s Rule 11 
provides that, “[t]he signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he 
has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed 
after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact.”456 In addition, the attorney, by 
signing, certifies that the pleading is “warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay 
or needless increase in the cost of litigation.”457 Of course, a complaint and an answer 
are pleadings.458 
Rule 11 requires that attorneys conduct “reasonable inquiry” and file only 




453 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-17-102(4) (2021). 
454 Id. 
455 Remote Switch Sys., Inc. v. Delangis, 126 P.3d 269, 275 (Colo. App. 2005). 
456 COLO. R. CIV. P. 11(a). 
457 Id. 
458 COLO. R. CIV. P. 7 specifies the following pleadings: complaint, answer, a reply to a 
counterclaim, answer to a cross-claim, third-party complaint, third-party answer, “and there 
may be a reply to an affirmative defense.” Of course, only a complaint and answer will exist in 
all cases. The defendant pleading affirmative defenses allows the plaintiff to reply to those 
affirmative defenses, which pushes back the at-issue date. See COLO. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(1) (“A 
case shall be deemed at issue when all parties have been served and all pleadings permitted by 
[COLO. R. CIV. P.] 7.”). Lawyers often mistakenly refer to motions, responses, and other 
documents outside Rule 7 as pleadings as if “pleading” were a generic term for any document 
a lawyer files with the court. 
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who violate the rule. Linked, the Colorado statute allows attorney fees against parties 
who present substantially frivolous or substantially groundless defenses or claims.459 
Any defense that lacks any factual support is groundless and frivolous. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article is about civil procedure, torts, insurance, litigation, and professional 
ethics. This empirical study draws data from trial courts using car crash lawsuits filed 
in the first six months of 2015. Plaintiffs’ lawyers filed a total of 1,538 such suits 
during this period, and I collected and analyzed 298 complaints and 356 answers. On 
average, these crashes took place about two years before filing, during which time 
drivers in Colorado drove 46,868 million VMT per year.460 This driving led to 103,687 
crashes of which about one quarter, or 25,760, resulted in injury.461 Not quite one in 
nine injury crashes (11.5%) led to the filing of a lawsuit.462 Altogether, personal injury 
litigation amounts to just under five percent of all civil litigation in Colorado, with car 
crash lawsuits comprising 60.2% of all personal injury lawsuits.463 Understanding torts 
and personal injury litigation means investigating car crashes, which is not a sexy 
topic. 
Stanford Law School’s Professor Nora Freeman Engstrom has looked at the 
claimant’s side of personal injury claiming in a series of terrific articles. This work 
has looked instead at the defense and specifically at what I call—adapting Professor 
Engstrom’s terminology—insurance defense mill lawyers. These are the lawyers right 
at the heart of personal injury litigation who represent car crash defendants, who work 
for or are paid for by insurance companies, and who file answers to the complaints of 
personal injury lawyers—many of whom advertise on billboards or TV. Less noticed, 
perhaps, is that the insurance companies also advertise everywhere. 
This Article shows that the insurance defense mill lawyers engage in practices that 
ought to surprise—shock, really—anyone who believes that lawyers ought to follow 
the law. I show that when answering a complaint, insurance defense mill lawyers 
habitually ignore the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. Despite clear guidance from 
Rule 8, insurance defense mill lawyers answer evasively by using specious claims that 
the Rules do not support. They typically refuse to answer when they believe the 
complaint asks about a legal conclusion. They do not answer allegations that concern 
a codefendant or another person. Instead of answering allegations that concern 
statutes, Traffic Accident Reports, insurance policies, or other documents, the 
insurance defense mill lawyers claim that the documents speak for themselves. But 
they don’t. 
 
459 SHEILA K. HYATT & STEPHEN A. HESS, WEST’S COLORADO PRACTICE SERIES, CIVIL RULES 
ANNOTATED R. 8 (5th ed. 2020) (“Litigants should familiarize themselves with both Rule 11 
and with the Colorado legislation that governs the attorney's responsibility for insuring that the 
litigation process is not abused.”). 
460 See sources cited supra note 92. 
461 See supra notes 102103 and accompanying text. 
462 See supra text accompanying notes 126128. 
463 See supra Table 1 and note 129. 
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Insurance defense mill lawyers in my opinion often do not investigate before 
answering, which violates both Rule 11 and the Rules of Professional Conduct. After 
crashes, insurance companies investigate. Indeed, the insurers are obliged to do so. On 
average, plaintiffs’ lawyers filed complaints two years after the crash. The Rules allow 
defense attorneys twenty-one days to answer, but defense lawyers file only about one 
in ten answers that quickly. Instead, the median number of weeks from the filing of 
the complaint to the filing of an answer seems to be about seven, which, even in the 
absence of a claim file, is plenty of time to investigate at least the basic facts of a car 
crash. 
The affirmative defenses that insurance defense mill lawyers file with their 
answers are lists of groundless, frivolous defenses that lawyers or their paralegals cut 
and paste into the answers. These lists of defenses violate the Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Colorado statutes, and, in my opinion as a law professor and member of the bar, the 
ethical requirements of the legal profession. I do not believe that we should dignify 
systematic departures from the Rules of Civil Procedure with the term “professional,” 
nor do I think that signing pleadings into which paralegals have cut and pasted laundry 
lists of affirmative defenses is appropriate professional behavior. Practicing law in this 
way fails to meet any conception of professionalism with which I am familiar. 
Why do insurance defense lawyers practice law like this? I plan to explore this 
issue in more detail after interviewing defense lawyers, their paralegals, and others in 
much the same way that Professor Engstrom interviewed personal injury lawyers. 
There are many explanations for the departure of defense lawyers from the rules of 
pleading. One explanation about which I mostly have third-hand knowledge is that 
insurance companies have increasingly put the squeeze on insurance defense firms by 
reducing the amount they will pay to the lawyers who defend their insureds. 
Competition for the business that auto insurance companies provide to defense 
firms—especially to defense mills that, obviously, are not in-house—leads defense 
lawyers to do less and less when answering. The Rules of Professional Conduct for 
lawyers require that we stand up to clients whose demands push us to behave below 
professional norms. At some point, when the client refuses to pay for what needs to 
be done, lawyers with ethical standards have to turn down the work. 
The simplest answer, though, for why insurance defense mill lawyers practice law 
in this way is because they can get away with ignoring the rules and not investigating 
before they answer. They are, of course, willing participants in the practices that I have 
described in this Article. Defense lawyers ignore the Rules of Civil Procedure because 
the plaintiffs’ bar allows them to do so. Although the legal profession relies on norms 
of self-policing, litigation’s essence is adversarial. Plaintiffs’ lawyers rarely file 
motions asking defense lawyers to provide better answers. In part, they do not file 
motions challenging the normal practices of evasion and non-investigation because 
those motions take an enormous amount of time. Simply describing a list of nine 
affirmative defenses took many pages in this Article; more pages are necessary to add 
the citations and to convince a judge to order the defense attorney to amend the answer.  
A more important explanation for how insurance defense mill attorneys get away 
with evading the law and the norms of the profession is that the plaintiffs’ bar’s 
acquiescence regarding frivolous defenses is a kind of compromise that expresses the 
symbiosis between the insurance industry and the plaintiffs’ bar. Professor Engstrom 
has shown how plaintiff-side settlement mills work in tandem with insurance firms 
and churn out small settlements of small cases in an efficient manner that may not 
make all law professors greatly proud of the profession. The same kind of implicit 
agreement not to be disruptive seems to support frivolous defenses. 
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Of course, judges also condone departures from the rules. A rare few judges—only 
Judge Shadur, really, and he has died—review answers sua sponte and force defense 
lawyers to file answers that comport with the Rules of Civil Procedure.464 My 
experience is that when asked by plaintiffs’ lawyers via motions to strike or motions 
for more definite statements, few judges grant motions striking fact-free lists of 
affirmative defenses and answers that evade by ignoring the rules. Why do judges do 
this? Perhaps because the bad pleading is part of the culture, and judges tend not to 
want to rock the boat. Other explanations for such judicial behavior include that the 
judges are subject to bureaucratic pressure that causes them to believe—wrongly, I 
think—that pre-trial motions that force the defense to present facts and confine their 
responses within the rules will tend to prolong litigation. I think the opposite is true. 
Another explanation is that judges’ unwillingness to force insurance defense lawyers 
to plead within the rules may also reflect the judges’ own bias against personal injury 
plaintiffs. 
For car crash cases, which dominate personal injury litigation, the attorneys 
answering complaints have plenty of time and resources that they should use to 
comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Professional Conduct. The 
defense lawyers, their counterparts in the plaintiffs’ bar, judges, injured people, and 





























464 See Russell, supra note 141. 
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